Information, Control and Games-Normal Form (one-shot) games. Solution concepts: the Nash Equilibrium. Lecture 2
Date Issued
2005
Date
2005
Author(s)
Yang, Yi-Nung
DOI
246246/2006092815521159
Abstract
A finite set N of players
N = { 1, 2, …. , i , ……n}
A set of strategies Si for each player
Strategies (actions ) set
Si = { si : si is a strategy available to player i } Si may be finite or infinite.
A payoff function i for each player.
i assigns a payoff to player i depending on which strategies the players have chosen.
N = { 1, 2, …. , i , ……n}
A set of strategies Si for each player
Strategies (actions ) set
Si = { si : si is a strategy available to player i } Si may be finite or infinite.
A payoff function i for each player.
i assigns a payoff to player i depending on which strategies the players have chosen.
Publisher
臺北市:國立臺灣大學電機工程學系
Type
report
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game-normal-form-v1_1.ppt
Size
326 KB
Format
Microsoft Powerpoint
Checksum
(MD5):e48adbabd666c2e99b4aee63445d1b3c