Does CEO general managerial ability matter in M&A voting?
Journal
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
Journal Volume
92
Pages
14-24
Date Issued
2023-12
Author(s)
Abstract
In this study, we examine the influence of CEO general managerial ability on M&A voting events. The results indicate that CEO general managerial ability relates positively to M&A voting outcomes. Furthermore, firms run by CEOs with high levels of general managerial skill tend to enjoy better short-term and long-term stock performances. In addition, we find active funds to be more (less) likely to vote in line with the recommendations of the management of invested firms when market reactions around announcement dates are positive (negative). The main results are the same after using the state-level non-compete agreement to address possible omitted variable bias.
Subjects
CEO general managerial ability | Long-run abnormal return | M&A voting | Short-run abnormal return
Publisher
Elsevier B.V.
Type
journal article