從John H. Ely的代表性補強理論檢討 司法違憲審查正當性爭議

Abstract

由於我國對司法違憲審查正當性的探討仍屬相當有限，因此本文乃先對美國學界就司法違憲審查正當性爭議的討論，作一個簡要的介紹與批評，希望一方面能藉此使國人在美國學界既有的基礎上，而為更深入或創新的討論，同時也為接下來代表性補強理論的介紹作一背景的鋪陳。

對此，筆者在介紹完John Hart Ely教授的代表性補強理論之後，乃對司法違憲審查正當性爭議的問題加以回應。筆者認為，由於代表性補強理論主張司法不該越權替擁有直接民主正當性的國會作某些實體價值判斷，因此司法違憲審查的抗多數困境得以略為紓解；此外，因其賦予司法的是一種不同傳統「政治市場監督者」的角色，主張唯有在政治市場發生系統性失靈時，司法才得以介入，並且透過司法的適時介入而暢通政治變遷管道，或是落實對少數的實質代表機制，這使得原本失靈的政治市場能夠回歸常軌，進而維護了民主而得以化解民主正當性爭議與司法違憲審查間的緊張關係。

接著，本文則整理其他學者對代表性補強理論的批評，包括其他學者對其理論預設多元民主的批評、認為代表性補強理論對司法之所以能維護民主的論述充滿矛盾、認為代表性補強理論忽視了對社經地位的不平等所造成的大眾對政治消極被動的現象、認為司法應該真正加強憲法保護的對象是孤立而隔絕的少數、以及瀰漫於整個理論而隨處可見的實體價值判斷等等。隨後並以其他學者對代表性補強理論的批判為基礎，在不變更其骨幹的情況下，主張政治市場系統性失靈的現象眾多，不必限於形式參與的排除等典型情況，以及對不利且針對匿名與四散少數的法律須從嚴審查其合憲性，對代表性補強理論略為修正。

最後，除了理論面上的探討，筆者更將其重新應用於我國大法官關於暢通政治變遷管道，以及保護少數的幾號重要解釋，不但顯示代表性補強理論於具體案例中如何操作，更證明代表性補強理論確實能為我國的釋憲實務帶來某些創新而另類的思維。

Because There are few discussions about the legitimacy of judicial review in Taiwan, we have a brief discussion about the dispute of legitimacy of judicial review in the U.S. academy at first, hoping that this could be helpful for Taiwanese academy to have deeper and more innovative discussions in one hand, and that this could be helpful to set a background of the representative reinforcement theory in the other hand.

Therefore, having introduced professor John H. Ely’s representative reinforcement theory, we makes several responses to the dispute of legitimacy of judicial review. This article suggests because representative reinforcement theory holds that the court shouldn’t make substantial value determinations, and that it intervenes only when the political market is systematically malfunctioning, there are less tension between judiciary and democracy.

Afterwards, this article also collects otheresearchers’ critiques on representative reinforcement theory. Based on these critiques, we hold that there are much more phenomenon of systematically malfunctioning of political market than Ely had identified. Therefore, we have no need to limit ourselves to exclusion from formal political participation and prejudice against discrete and insular minorities as the only phenomenon of systematically malfunctioning of political market.

At the end of this article, we even apply the revised representative reinforcement theory to several important decisions about clearing the channels of political change and facilitating the representation of minorities, not only to reveal how representative reinforcement theory can be applied in concrete cases, but also to prove that representative reinforcement theory does give some innovative and different thinking for the practice of interpreting constitution in Taiwan.