https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/165846
標題: | 銀行擠兌、暫停存款提領與銀行業之市場監督機制 | 其他標題: | Bank Runs, Convertibility Suspension, and Market Discipline in the Banking Industry | 作者: | 陳業寧 | 關鍵字: | 銀行擠兌;傳染性恐慌;銀行自有資本比率管制;暫停存款提領;存款保險;資訊透明度;bank run;contagion;bank capital regulation;convertibility suspension;deposit insurance;information transparency | 公開日期: | 2003 | 出版社: | 臺北市:國立臺灣大學財務金融學系暨研究所 | 摘要: | 本計畫探討銀行擠兌的本質及相關政策議題。本計畫由兩篇論文所組成。在第一 篇論文中,我們發現存款人提款的誘因會受到銀行相關資訊的品質及數量的影 響。當存款人預期包含許多雜訊之資訊將被揭露、或預期很精確的資訊將不會被 揭露,銀行擠兌都會發生。這樣的擠兌並不效率。該文也探討如何用暫停存款提 領的方式來提高銀行擠兌的效率。暫停存款提領的措施有兩個好處。一是迫使存 款人延後其提領決策,讓存款人有更多銀行相關資訊時再決定是否提領。二則是 在暫停提領期間,政府或負責銀行票據交換之機構常會查核銀行的狀況並予以揭 露,使存款人在銀行再度開始營業時有更精確的資訊來決定是否提領。透過這些 機制,暫停存款提領可以提高銀行擠兌的效率。若其所造成之存款人流動損失不 大,則暫停存款提領將可提高存款人福利。 本計畫的第二篇論文討論銀行資訊透明程度與傳染性擠兌間之關係。在該文 中,傳染性擠兌是指因其他銀行(非擠兌發生銀行)之負面消息所引發的不效率 擠兌。文中發現,當銀行揭露更多資訊時,傳染性擠兌發生的機率可能變高或變 低。又當政府要求銀行揭露更多資訊時,資訊品質較差的銀行較易發生傳染性擠 兌。此外,銀行業體質不佳時傳染性擠兌亦較容易發生。第二篇論文也討論了如 何以銀行自有資本比率管制或存款保險來解決傳染性擠兌的問題。文中證明,如 果銀行持有足夠的自有資本、或政府提供適當的存款保險,則銀行揭露更多訊息 必定會降低傳染性擠兌的發生機率並提高存款人福利。此結果的政策含意為:當 政府要求銀行揭露更多資訊時,應注意銀行自有資本比率管制或存款保險等配套 措施以使存款人能更有效率的運用資訊。 This project studies the nature of information-based bank runs and the related policy issues. It is composed of two related paper. The first one shows that the depositors’ incentives to withdraw are affected by their expectations on both the amount and the quality of the bank-related information that will be revealed in the future. More specifically, a bank run will occur when depositors learn that more noisy information will arrive, or when they realize that precise information about bank returns will not be revealed. Such bank runs are inefficient. The paper also demonstrates how convertibility suspension can improve the efficiency of bank runs. By forcing depositors to delay their withdrawing decisions until more information is revealed, and by producing more precise information about bank assets, convertibility suspension makes bank runs a more efficient mechanism for monitoring banks. It is shown that convertibility suspension is beneficial if the fraction of depositors who have liquidity needs during the suspension period is small, or if the liquidity losses of the depositors who cannot successfully withdraw are not serious. The second paper investigates the relationship between information transparency and the fragility of the banking industry. It is found that an improvement in information transparency may either increase or decrease the chance of a contagious run. It predicts that, when a government imposes stricter information disclosure rules in the banking industry, contagious runs are more likely to occur to banks with poor information quality. In addition, contagious runs are more likely to happen when the banking industry is weak. The second paper also demonstrates that the contagious run problem can be solved if banks hold enough capital or if some of the deposits are insured. It is shown that, once contagious runs are eliminated, an improvement in information transparency always improves depositor welfare. This result implies that, when a government requires banks to disclose more precise information, it should also adopt mechanisms that can induce depositors to use information efficiently. |
URI: | http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/16277 | 其他識別: | 912416H002031 | Rights: | 國立臺灣大學財務金融學系暨研究所 |
顯示於: | 財務金融學系 |
檔案 | 描述 | 大小 | 格式 | |
---|---|---|---|---|
912416H002031.pdf | 317.94 kB | Adobe PDF | 檢視/開啟 |
在 IR 系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。