https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/169107
Title: | 不對稱資訊下之政府BOT 政策 Government’s BOT Policies under Asymmetric Information |
Authors: | 荷世平 Ho, S.Ping |
Keywords: | BOT;不對稱資訊;政府政策;賽局理論;公共工程民營化;Asymmetric Informatio;, Government Policy;Game Theory;Infrastructure Privatization | Issue Date: | 2003 | Publisher: | 臺北市:國立臺灣大學土木工程學系暨研究所 | Abstract: | 全球之公共建設民營化金額自西元1984 年以來平均約每年2 兆1 千億元。 自1989 年至今,至少有300 個重大BOT 工程案正在進行或已完成。由於民營化 公共工程案較一般工程案複雜至多,因此政府於評選適當之開發者時倍為困難。 因此,許多BOT 工程案未能成功的達成預期理想而受擾於嚴重的成本超支或工期 延誤。再者,大量的政府或民間資金投入於民營公共工程之中,因此工程案的失 政府評選BOT 工程案開發者的困難之癥結點在於大部分關於開發者的品質 重要資訊無法為政府所知悉。政府無法從業者提案中完全了解開發者的開發能力, 因為業者有可能隱藏許多對業者不利之訊息。此種現象學者稱之為“不對稱資 訊” (information asymmetry) 現象。例如業者在工程案中的成本與利潤結構、工 程之商業及技術的風險等資訊有可能為業者所隱瞞,若其資訊對業者在提案之評 估中不利。此類業者自知而非政府可察之資訊稱之為“私有資訊”。因此,若政 府未能採用有效之評選政策用以評估業者及其提案,政府極有可能選中不良之業 者而造成後患無窮與社會資源之浪費。有鑑於此,政府極需一套有效的政策或機 制以使不同品質之業者依其品質的私有資訊而“自我選擇” (self-select into) 入 政府的評估標準,以致最佳之業者會得到最佳之評估分數。換言之,在此評選機制 或政策下,業者若隱瞞其真實品質資訊將對業者自身之獲利狀況有所損害。 此本研究計劃以近代“賽局理論” (Game theory)來分析及建立在資訊不對 稱情況下之BOT 工程案政策。此模式將考慮業者工程財務特性及政府評選政策 之互動情形。模式之建立將提供政府制定BOT 評選標準與政策之理論基礎與指 導方針。本計劃亦運用所建之模型檢視並指出當今政府BOT 政策調整之方針,並 提出更有效之策略,以為全球各政府於BOT 開發建立一決策理論基礎。 The complexity of privatized infrastructure projects typically makes it difficult for the government to select the most appropriate project developers; therefore, many projects failed or had serious cost overruns and schedule delays. The most fundamental problem is that most developer specific and critical information regarding the infrastructure development may not be fully revealed to the government in the development proposal. In other words, such information is asymmetric. For example, the developer’s cost and profit structures, and project’s commercial and technical risk assessment information may not be fully revealed in, or consistent with, the developer’s proposal. If the government adopts an ineffective policy and selects the developer accordingly, it may be that the developer is not the best developer that the government hopes to team up with. Government needs to have effective policies so that different types of developer will “self-select” into the evaluation scheme/criteria according to the developer’s private information and then the best developer will earn highest evaluation points. In this project, we build a framework for effective project evaluation/screening. We develop a Game Theoretic model to analyze government’s tendering policies under asymmetric information. This model considers the interactions between the project developer’s financial positions and government policies. The results may provide theoretic foundations and guidelines for examining the effectiveness of government’s infrastructure privatization tendering policies. |
URI: | http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/2824 | Other Identifiers: | 912211E002091 | Rights: | 國立臺灣大學土木工程學系暨研究所 |
Appears in Collections: | 土木工程學系 |
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912211E002091.pdf | 77.92 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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