意識、意向性與經驗的非概念性內涵(II-I)

Abstract

本計畫將研究心靈哲學的一個重要論爭：知覺經驗是否具有非概念性的內容 （nonconceptual content）？根據概念論（conceptualism），我們之所以能說經驗是 關於外在世界，以及經驗能提供理由來支持信念，完全是由於經驗所具有的概念 性內容（conceptual content）。根據非概念論（nonconceptualism），雖然對經驗進 行描述需要運用概念能力（conceptual capacities），但若因此認為概念是經驗的構 成成分，或認為經驗只具有概念性的內容，則是一項嚴重錯誤。在這兩年的計畫 裏（2004 & 2005），我將處理關於此論爭的三個重要議題。第一，檢驗非概念論 的一個重要論證：the Fineness of Grain Argument。我將設法指出，這個論證無 法擊潰概念論。第二，檢驗非概念論的另一個重要論證；根據此論證，要擁有知 覺經驗並不需要具備相關的概念。我打算指出，對於此論證是否成功，概念論與 非概念論現有的主張和理由均不能令人滿意。我會對此議題提出自己的立場。第 三，探討經驗與證成（justification）之間的關係：為了解釋經驗如何提供理由來 支持信念，是否非得訴諸經驗的概念性內容不可？我會根據對這些議題的研究， 提出對於「概念論-非概念論」之論爭的整體主張。

This project investigates an important debate in the philosophy of mind: Does perceptual experience have nonconceptual content? According to conceptualism, it is because the content of experience is exclusively conceptual that we are entitled to say that our experience is about the external world and that experience can justify empirical beliefs. According to nonconceptualism, although we need to exercise conceptual capacities to describe experience, it is a fundamental mistake to think that experience is thereby constituted by concepts or that experience possesses only conceptual content. In this two-year project (2004 & 2005), I plan to tackle three issues related to this debate. First, I will examine an important argument for nonconceptualism―the Fineness of Grain Argument. I intend to show that this argument is not able to refute conceptualism. Second, I will examine another argument for nonconceptualism, according to which one can have perceptual experience without having relevant concepts. I intend to show that the current arguments offered by both conceptualists and nonconceptualists are wanting, and then propose my own view on this issue. Third, I will investigate the relation between experience and justification. More specifically, I want to address the issue: Does the content of experience has to be exclusively conceptual in order to properly explain how experience provides justification for empirical beliefs? Based on the research on these issues, I will propose my overall position on the conceptualismnonconceptualism debate regarding the content of experience.