意識、意向性與經驗的非概念性內涵(II-I)
Date Issued
2005-07-31
Date
2005-07-31
Author(s)
DOI
932411H002101
Abstract
This project investigates an important debate in the philosophy of mind: Does
perceptual experience have nonconceptual content? According to conceptualism, it is
because the content of experience is exclusively conceptual that we are entitled to say
that our experience is about the external world and that experience can justify
empirical beliefs. According to nonconceptualism, although we need to exercise
conceptual capacities to describe experience, it is a fundamental mistake to think that
experience is thereby constituted by concepts or that experience possesses only
conceptual content. In this two-year project (2004 & 2005), I plan to tackle three
issues related to this debate. First, I will examine an important argument for
nonconceptualism―the Fineness of Grain Argument. I intend to show that this
argument is not able to refute conceptualism. Second, I will examine another
argument for nonconceptualism, according to which one can have perceptual
experience without having relevant concepts. I intend to show that the current
arguments offered by both conceptualists and nonconceptualists are wanting, and then
propose my own view on this issue. Third, I will investigate the relation between
experience and justification. More specifically, I want to address the issue: Does
the content of experience has to be exclusively conceptual in order to properly explain
how experience provides justification for empirical beliefs? Based on the research on
these issues, I will propose my overall position on the conceptualismnonconceptualism
debate regarding the content of experience.
Subjects
the Content of Experience
Conceptualism
Nonconceptualism
Publisher
臺北市：國立臺灣大學哲學系暨研究所
Type
report
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