|Title:||論休姆的德行與原則||Authors:||蔡宜珍||Keywords:||個人價值;明智的旁觀者;同情作用;仁慈;正義;協議;道德;情感;道德感;justice;the sentiment of moral;judicious spectator;passions;benevolence;moral;sympathy;personal merit;convention||Issue Date:||2004||Abstract:||
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and clarify Hume’s moral theory. Through the examination of his classification of moral virtues, I try to find out the moral principle on which these virtues depended. From the discussion of justice and benevolence, I try to present the foundation of moral judgments. Furthermore, after drawing the outline of Hume’s moral theory, I will analyze the moral language used by him and discuss the objectivity of moral judgments in his theory.
In the first chapter, I point out his explanations of the roles of reason and passion in moral judgments ( passion is primary and reason is secondary) and consider the function of the particular sentiment of morals. Also, in this chapter, I analyze good and evil and virtue and vice from the original structure of human nature. Hume contends that moral phenomena emerge from human nature, not from religions or other authorities. In the second chapter, I elaborate the reason why justice and benevolence are virtuous. Including motive theory, convention, selfishness, limited generosity, love, hatred, and sympathy, all of these are the essential factors which can make certain qualities being considered as virtues. The above two chapters show that Hume’s moral philosophy is the “altruistic tendency” since virtues including sympathy are fundamentally connected with moral principles.
The third chapter focuses on the reflections on the suitableness of Hume’s classification of virtues, especially on the four classes of Personal Merit. I adopt Davie and Vodraska’s debates to argue whether Hume has successfully employed moral language to construct his moral system. The last chapter discusses the Judicious Spectator. Hume employs the Judicious Spectator and its extending concept, “the corrected position,” to enforce his moral theory. Every moral agent will correct his own point of view to stand on the same position to make the same judgment with other “judicious spectators.” So, he could avoid the criticism of subjectivity and arbitrariness. Finally, I also state the concept of the Judicious Spectator and its relevant controversial issues to reveal my doubts of his solution.
|Appears in Collections:||哲學系|
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