Williamson on Vagueness and Sorites Paradox

The aim of this thesis is to defend epistemicist theory of vagueness. In the first chapter, I shall analyze the genesis of vagueness and the problems that arise from borderline cases. I will also briefly introduce various approaches toward vagueness; these approaches include Williamson’s epistemicism, Hajek’s degree theory/fuzzy logic, Keefe’s supervaluationalism, and Unger’s nihilism. Next I will thoroughly examine Keefe’s (2000) supervaluationalism and argue that her attempt to apply van Fraassen’s supervaluations on empty name to vague expression is illegitimate. Moreover, her attempt to eliminate semantic vagueness simply misses the point. In the third chapter, I will focus on defending the epistemic view. I will also consider Schiffer’s (1999) and Keefe’s (2000) criticisms of Williamson’s strategy of explaining our ignorance and Mott’s (1998) accusation that the margin for error principle makes iteration of knowledge impossible. In addition, I will try to dispel challenges recently put forth by Dorr (2003), who suggests substituting unassertability with ignorance, and Ray (2004), who attempts to show that epistemicism is self-defeating through his three-way undermining. Last but not least, I will conclude that the epistemic view is the most promising theory of vagueness so far.