異象與異生︰論德勒茲的思考問題

Abstract

本論文探討德勒茲的思考問題。我將指出︰首先，對德勒茲而言，思考是人的在世存有的一種表現，而這種在世存有的本質在於身體、語言和思考彼此異質的異象經驗。其次，藉由風格化這一種經驗方式，思考實地創造了一種異於異象經驗的新存有，就此而言，思考則是創造嶄新經驗的異生過程。 本文採用歷史研究和系統研究兩種方法。為了給德勒茲思考問題提供一指涉脈絡，第二章將先行討論海德格的思考問題。對海德格來說，思考是此有的存在方式，其本質在於語言先天指向事物的意向經驗。另一方面，由於此有的存在指的是一種此有的具體自我呈現過程，因此思考其實也就是對於意向經驗的不斷創造。總而言之，對海德格而言，思考既是人的在世存有，也是對於這種存有的主動創造。 第三章透過德勒茲對於海德格經驗概念的批判，來詮釋他的在世存有概念。德勒茲批判的主要論點是︰意向經驗隱藏了思考的本具性預設，因此無法從學習和探索的角度徹底說明嶄新思考形成。對德勒茲而言，唯有由身體來裂解語言、思考及其自身之間的任何既定關連、進而使三者彼此異質，才能粉碎原先的本具性思考，也才能說明新的思考如何產生。我以「異象經驗」一詞來指稱這種以身體為中心、同時維持了身體、語言和思考之間異質關係的在世存有。 第四章以異象經驗為基礎，正式說明德勒茲的思考問題。Difference and Repetition 所謂的「無形象思考」指的其實就是作為異象經驗之表現樣態的思考。但因為Difference and Repetition 對身體論題的處理偏於抽象和概念化，所以無形象思考還不是一種實地的創作。一直到A Thousand Plateaus，身體才被看為真實的行動者，這使得思考終於得以透過異生創造一種不同於異象經驗的「抽象生命」。 最後，我試圖從共時性和歷時性兩個角度重新檢驗德勒茲的思考問題。從共時性角度觀之，德勒茲的思考問題和海德格的一樣都從在世存有的概念蛻變為在世存有的創造。然而因為這個在世存有是以某種特定的在世經驗為範本，所以它必然過度簡化了這種在世存有從一開始就已經預設的世界的複雜性。正因如此，基於這種在世存有的創造勢必不足以徹底地創新。接下來，我試圖透過德勒茲思考問題的歷時性觀點來探討這種複雜性。就歷時觀點而言，德勒茲的思考問題以其異象經驗為基礎，後者則是針對意向經驗的批判。但正是因為德勒茲賦予身體以主導異質關係的絕對能力，他也就忽視了異象關係早已預設的身體、語言和思考之間的複雜性。我認為，或許可以透過這三者的交感與互動來體驗、思考與創造這樣一種複雜性。

This thesis studies Deleuze’s question of thinking. Firstly, I attempt to demonstrate that, for Deleuze, thinking is a mode of man’s Being-in-the-world, the essence of which consists in the hieroglyphic experience where body, language and thinking are entirely heterogeneous to one another. Secondly, I shall point out that, by stylizing the concept of hieroglyphic experience, thinking turns from a mode of man’s being into an active creation of man’s new being. Insofar as the latter is borne from something entirely other through thinking, thinking is precisely heterogenesis, namely a creation that always creates the different. In this thesis, both a historical and a systematic analysis are adopted as method. In order to provide a referential context for Deleuze’s question of thinking, I discuss firstly Heidegger’s question of thinking in the second chapter. For Heidegger, thinking is a mode of Dasein’s Being, the essence of which consists in the intentional experience where language is innately directed to body. On the other hand, since Dasein’s Being means the process of Dasein’s concrete action, thinking is also a continuous creation of intentional experience in a more profound sense. Summarily, then, Heidegger’s thinking is both the mode of man’s Being-in-the-world and the creation of it. In the third chapter, I try to interpret Deleuze’s own concept of man’s being in the world through his critique of Heidegger. According to his critique, the intentional experience presupposes the innateness of thought, and therefore cannot account for how a new way of thinking is borne from learning and experiment. For Deleuze, this is possible only if body enacts the heterogeneous relation among language, thinking and itself, so that no innate relation among them holds at all. A Being-in-the-world that revolves around the body and consists in such a heterogeneous relation is what I call a hieroglyphic experience. The next chapter then sets out to explicate Deleuze’s question of thinking through this concept of hieroglyphic experience. What Difference and Repetition calls “thought without image” is precisely thinking as a mode of hieroglyphic experience. However, since Difference and Repetition treats the body in a rather abstract manner, thought without image is far from a real creation. It is not until A Thousand Plateaus that body is treated both as the real and the active agent, so that thinking finally turns into the heterogenesis of an abstract life hitherto unknown to the corporeality of hieroglyphic experience. Finally, I try to re-examine Deleuze’s question of thinking from both a synchronic and a diachronic viewpoint. Synchronically, just like Heidegger’s question of thinking, Deleuze’s own question of thinking undergoes a metamorphosis from the concept of Being-in-the-world to the creation of it. However, since this concept of Being-in-the-world is modeled after a particular experience, it is necessarily a reductive interpretation of the fundamental complexity of the world. As a consequence, the creation of thinking borne from such Being-in-the-world is not radical enough to create the new. I then shift to the diachronic viewpoint to investigate in what such complexity might consist. Diachronically, Deleuze’s question of thinking is based on his concept of hieroglyphic experience, which is a radical critique of Heidegger’s concept of intentional experience. But precisely because Deleuze privileges body with the absolute power to enact the heterogeneous relation, he overlooks the already presupposed complexity among body, language and thinking. I suggest that perhaps the free inter-relation and interaction among body, language and thinking might provide a clue to experience, understand and create such complexity.