在差異中建立社會整合─論羅爾斯的「重疊共識」

Abstract

本文旨在說明羅爾斯如何以「重疊共識」在當代民主社會所既存的差異中建立起社會整合。承繼自由主義的核心精神，羅爾斯簡稱其理論為「正義即公平」，主張透過公平程序制定的正義原則可被所有公民一致接受。然而，預設康德式相關主張的「正義即公平」，事實上無法達成此目的。為了解決理論困難，羅爾斯確立其正義理論是以當代憲政民主社會為背景。在不同合理全面性學說的多元分歧下，政治性正義觀作為最適合的正義觀，不僅獨立於任何合理全面性學說，更以共享基本直觀理念為內容前提。若此，羅爾斯進一步主張，政治性正義觀可以得到公民由自己合理全面性學說出發的一致支持，形成重疊共識。儘管遭遇到哈伯瑪斯等哲學家的批評，認為羅爾斯不証成政治性正義觀為哲學上的真理，而只是公民之間的共識，是放棄了作為哲學家追求真理的本分，然而羅爾斯指出，其理論目的不同於傳統政治哲學家，而重疊共識所給予政治性正義觀的証成是「政治社會的公共証成」。因此，由各個合理全面性學說所形成的重疊共識，將促使政治性正義觀作為當代憲政民主社會中的公共基礎，而建立起社會整合。

The purpose of this thesis is to elucidate how John Rawls forges social unity amid the diversity in the modern constitutional democracy by the concept of “overlapping consensus.” Having inherited the spirit from the political liberalism, Rawls offers an account of “justice as fairness,” claiming that the principle of justice justified by fair procedure could be accepted by all citizens. The theory of justice based on Kantian’s ideas, however, fails to achieve the aim. In order to overcome the difficulty, Rawls in his later work focuses on the diversity in the modern constitutional democracy. Due to the fact of reasonable pluralism, Rawls endorses that political conception of justice as the most adequate conception of justice that is not only independent of all reasonable comprehensive doctrines but also bases on fundamental intuitive ideas. Rawls further claims that political conception of justice could be overlapping consensus between citizens who hold different reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Many philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas argue that Rawls gave up doing what a philosopher should do for he didn’t justify political conception of justice as philosophically true. However, Rawls defends that his theoretical purpose is different from traditional political philosophers. The justification of political conception of justice made by overlapping consensus is “public justification by political society.” Therefore, the idea of overlapping could be the public basis of modern constitutional democracy and could forge social unity.