梅洛龐第《知覺現象學》一書當中的意向性

Abstract

本論文各章是以《知覺現象學》(Phenomenology of Perception，簡稱PP)的前言(Preface)當作主軸，分別探討梅洛龐第(Maurice Merleau-Ponty)此書當中的意向性(intentionality)問題，尤其著眼於「意向性和意義(meaning/sense)的相關性」。這個相關性，是我認為《知覺現象學》一書的主要哲學貢獻。然而，這並不是單一的問題，此議題的複雜性有二：一、何以梅洛龐第能夠宣稱意義(sense/le sens)先於語言及概念（關於這個命題的證成與靈感，筆者所仰賴的是Lazlo Tengelyi的大作，The Wild Region in Life-History一書當中關於梅洛龐第及胡賽爾的討論；此外，le sens「意義」這個法文字的內涵其實相當廣泛，包含「感官」、「意義」或「方向」，因為意義同時與個人的理解(understanding)與溝通(communication)有關。）；二、意向性作為心靈現象與物理現象的分野，它必然同時涉及到意識(consciousness)的本質，及主體(subject)的本性，這一類議題，屬於意向性的「本體論(ontology)」（見本文第一章）。 關於意向性的本體論，一如胡賽爾(Edmund Husserl)在《觀念 I》第八十四節的標題所標舉的，現象學最主要的議題就是意向性，而意向性卻又是以「能思與所思」(noesis-noema)的結構當作是意識的基本架構。因此，很多人認為，「能思所思」的意向性結構，其實就是一種知識論上(epistemology)的主客對立的二元論結構。而一旦某個哲學立場，對於主體的陳述，放棄主客對立的認知結構，也就必須放棄徹底放棄意向性的結構。因此，有些人進而認為，梅洛龐第一旦採取身體主體(body-subject)的身心一元論的主體論主張，就勢必要放棄任何胡賽爾現象學中的意向性的主張。筆者以為，在《知覺現象學》中，梅洛龐第並未採取批判胡賽爾而且否定意向性的策略。他站在回顧哲學史的立場，發展胡賽爾的運行意向性(operative intentionality)的概念，進而樹立他自己獨特的身體主體的意向性的本體論結構：意向性將意義奠基(founding upon)在身體主體的知覺活動(perception)上。並藉由「先破再立」的方式，去批判經驗主義及新康德主義的知識論中的二元分立的意識結構。至於有關如何詮釋梅洛龐第《知覺現象學》一書中的論敵，及各章節間的問題意識的設定，本文採取的研究方法，是文獻回顧的方式，從梅洛龐第為《知覺現象學》一書所做的1933年和1935的兩個研究計畫(“The Nature of Perceptions: Two Proposals”)，及1959年的《存在哲學》(“The Philosophy of Existence”)，來尋找蛛絲馬跡。這些文獻的價值在於，當中可以發現梅洛龐第與胡賽爾現象學的關係：儘管梅洛龐第不像沙特(Jean-Paul Sartre)有直接聽過胡賽爾的演講，但是終其一生他自認為他繼承的是胡賽爾的最終的哲學立場；其次，在寫作《知覺現象學》的時期，梅洛龐第所瞭解的胡賽爾，主要還是透過顧維茲 (Aron Gurwitsch)的詮釋。所以儘管胡賽爾本人是將完形心理學(Gestalt psychology)當作是經驗科學，因而與現象學不相容；但是顧維茲卻是採取相容的立場，這個立場也被《知覺現象學》給繼承了。（見本文導論） 此本體論結構所產生的意向性，其獨特之處乃在於，梅洛龐第不再像近代哲學家一般，採取如科學家的觀察，將意識視為可被主體以旁觀者(spectator)的角度觀察得到的靜止狀態(conscious state)的集合體，由這種觀察來分析主體的意識活動。他認為，意識的運作，最根本不可化約的單位是意義，因此改而以「每個意識內容都對主體有意義(significant)」的基本前提出發，藉此去研究這種「意義功能(signification)」如何發生在身體主體的知覺活動上。所以，梅洛龐第所理解的胡賽爾的現象學的意向性，是「客體(object)以本質(eidos)將意識吸引到，或轉向(oriented/directed)到客體」，使客體在模糊的意識當中被顯題化(thematized)，進而成為日常語言中的概念(concept)的時刻。（此命題出現在梅氏的《現象學與人的科學》(“Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man”)一文中，見本文第一章第四節及最後一章的討論） 意義在每個個別的主體內的發展，有其歷程及時間性(temporality)，這也是梅洛龐第和胡賽爾以降的現象學的獨特之處。總體來說，梅洛龐第保留意向性在身體主體的結構之中的目的，最主要的還是考量到意識流的時間性：意識在它的內在時間當中，是以意義連貫著的。基本上，梅洛龐第觀察到的意義作用有兩個主要的部分：一為意義是「為己」(being-for-itself)的，一為意義作用發生時，主體在場(living present)，因為在場，所以主體能第一人稱地(first-personally)進行理解及回憶，而與事件沒有距離感。而為了描述在時間當中意義如何發展的動態過程(dynamics)，在語言的使用上，梅洛龐第有層次感地引進了黑格爾(Hegel)的辯證法的「在己」(being-in-itself)及「為己」的詞彙及論證方式，將它當作是一套中性的高階語言，或者討論一切理論優缺點的後設語言。基本上，梅洛龐第認為，這個動態過程是個辯證運動(dialectic)，然而意義所發展的場域，也就是主體內在的時間，梅洛龐第的靈感則是取材自柏格森(Henri Bergson)的「綿延」(durée)的概念，這種綿延，讓內在意義有個承載的連續體(continuum)。本文並試圖從這個角度，分析《知覺現象學》當中的重要的引述，「時間是生命的意義」(“Le temps est le sens de la vie”:410, PP)（見本文第一章） 本文第二及第三章，分別討論梅洛龐第如何批判休姆式的經驗主義，以及康德第一批判中的意識結構。容許我以一種心靈圖像的誇張對比(scenario)，來呈現梅洛龐第的所理解的休姆及康德：在休姆的知識論中，只有印象(impressions)及觀念(ideas)兩種組成份子，觀念是印象根據結合律(law of association)的組合，所以印象是簡單的(simple)心靈狀態，觀念是複合的心靈狀態；而關於康德的心靈結構，它是由兩種活動加總起來的：一、表相(representation / die Vorstellung)，二、使得表相成為可能的條件(possible condition) ——反思的自我意識(reflective self-conscious- ness) ——所組合而成，而表相是一個總類(genus)，（見康德第一批判B377頁），有意識的子類表相叫做知覺(perception)這個子類可再細分為只與主體相關的感覺(subjective sensation)、與客體相關的直覺(intuition)、及與客體相關的概念(concept)大體上，梅洛龐第所批判的康德知識論，大概就是這套概念系統。受到完形心理學的影響，梅洛龐第是個整體論者，他反對上述兩種心裡學。因此如何解釋意義作用，才是探討意識結構個關鍵。第二章探討根據完形心理學的整體論模式，意義如何在意向弧(intentional arc)當中形成。 本文第三章的重點，是在討論與笛卡兒「我思」(cogito)相關的議題。為了要採取第一人稱的方式來研究意義作用，首先，梅洛龐第必須藉助主體的反思(reflection)的活動，因為這能讓意義之屬於個別主體(individual subject)的面向，也就是「為己」的面向，被發現。梅洛龐第將哲學史上「為己」面的發現，歸功於康德哲學。但在此同時，他卻也小心的區隔出康德哲學，在研究意義作用的過程當中，一些不適當的哲學元素，也就是「分析的反思」(analytical reflection)，「主智主義」(intellectualism)，「形式主義」(formalism)的知覺理論，及將「表相」當作是意識活動的總類。而這樣的區隔，也間接形成了《知覺現象學》當中的一種行文特色：梅洛龐第為胡賽爾現象學中的「我思」，建立了有別於康德之批判哲學的獨特性。這表現在他前言當中兩個有力的宣稱：「胡賽爾的超驗(transcendental)並不是康德的超驗(PP, xiii)」，以及「康德的分析的反思將主體與世界隔離(PP, ix)」。此外，如何產生反思活動所必備的「超驗態度」(transcendental attitude)，是這章另一個重點，筆者將分析，何以梅洛龐第後期，在意識到語言在反思活動所扮演的重要性之後，會放棄《知覺現象學》第三部分中的第一章的重要主張：身體主體的「沈默的我思」(tacit cogito)。 本文最後一章，回到胡賽爾意向性的「能思與所思」的結構，談論顧維茲的疑慮，亦即：「所思」(noema)存不存在，是否會影響《知覺現象學》的合不合於胡賽爾的現象學宗旨的爭議。筆者的主張是，《知覺現象學》的前言中(PP, x)所宣示的「所思的反省」(noematic reflection)，就是梅洛龐第這整本書所做的哲學工作，亦即，探討「物體如何透過意義及感官(le sens)，將意識導引到物體」，因此顧維茲的疑慮，只是字面的爭議。本文並以「主體-客體-他者-自然」所構成的正四面體，當作是意向性這個問題在《知覺現象學》當中複雜的樣貌的總結。

Focusing on the relatedness of signification and intentionality, every chapter of this article surrounds the axis of the Preface of Phenomenology of Perception, and discusses each relevant facet of intentionality. This relatedness is what I consider the most important contribution of Merleau-Ponty in his oeuvre. However, this is a complex issue, and its complexity is twofold. First, how does Merleau-Ponty proclaim that there exists pre-linguistic or non-conceptual sense (le sens)? (With respect to the insight and the justification of this proposition, I rely heavily on Lazlo Tengelyi’s book, The Wild Region in Life-History) Secondly, intentionality, as the criterion of the mental and the physical phenomenon, must dip into both the nature of consciousness and subjectivity; therefore, the problem of intentionality is ontological. (See chapter one) We all know that Edmund Husserl asserts in section 84 of Ideas I that intentionality is the main phenomenological theme, and its structure is best described by that of noesis-noema. Therefore, it is commonly held that this noesis-noema structure is an epistemological opposition of subject and object, and once a philosophical stance abandon the cognitive subjectivity in that opposition, it must also abandon the noesis-noema structure, a fortiori, the issue of intentionality. Common opinion of this type validates the following specious inference: Merleau-Ponty must abandon the issue of intentionality in Phenomenology, if he holds the monistic stance in the mind-and-body problem, namely, in terms of his notion of body-subject (Subjektleib). However, Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology doesn’t seem to take the negative stance towards Husserl and the issue of intentionality; instead, he develops Husserl’s notion of operative intentionality (fungierende Intentionalität) into his unique ontological structure in body-subject, namely, (operative) intentionality founding le sens upon the perception of body-subject. On the other hand, he critiques in Phenomenology the structure of consciousness of both empiricism and neo-Kantianism in the epistemological opposition. With regard to the identification of the rivals and interpretation of the problematics in each chapter of Phenomenology, relevant evidence is reviewed in “The Nature of Perceptions: Two Proposals” wrote by Merleau-Ponty in 1933 and 1935, and in “The Philosophy of Existence” (1959). In discussion of these articles, we discover Merleau-Ponty’s connection with Husserl: even though he didn’t, as Jean-Paul Sartre did, attend Husserl’s lecture personally, he believes that he is consistent with Husserl’s final philosophical position. Moreover, in writing Phenomenology, his understanding of Husserl is mainly through the interpretation of Aron Gurwitsch. Therefore, even though Husserl holds that Gestalt psychology, as an empirical science, is incompatible to phenomenology, as eidetic science, Gurwitsch takes the compatiblism of the two, a stance that is inherited in Phenomenology. (See the introduction) The uniqueness of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of intentionality consists in his treatment of consciousness: it is no longer an aggregation of static states of consciousness observed by a spectator as much as scientist observes his object in experiment; instead, from the insight that the irreducible unit of consciousness is significance, and that every conscious content is significant to the body-subject, Merleau-Ponty begins his investigation of how signification happens on the perception of body-subject. Therefore, he understands Husserl’s intentionality, as stated in “Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man”, as “[t]his orientation of consciousness toward certain ‘intentional objects,’ which are open to an “eidetic” analysis, is what Husserl calls intentionality.” (See the final chapter and section four of chapter one) The development of significance in an individual subject has its process and temporality, a common trait of phenomenology extended to Merleau-Ponty. In general, the reason why he preserves intentionality in body-subject is based on the temporality of the stream of consciousness, namely, the derealized consciousness states are connected through significance in the inner time of subject. Basically, Merleau-Ponty implicitly sticks to two aspects of signification: first, the being-for the subject (pour-soi) of significance, and, second, during the first personal understanding and recollection of the of le sens of object, the living present of subject in the event without any distance to it. To describe this inner dynamics, he uses Hegelian terminology, the in-itself (en-soi) and for-itself, and the dialectical argumentation as the neutral language of all theories of consciousness, or as the explicans of his own model of consciousness, a model reminiscent of Henri Bergson’s notion of durée. Mutatis mutandis, durée becomes the important quotation of Claudel’s sentence in Phenomenology, namely, “Le temps est le sens de la vie” (PP, 410); in this formula, Merleau-Ponty’s attempt is effulgent: to create the continuum in body-subject that carries le sens of object. Chapter two and chapter three discusses Merleau-Ponty’s critiques of the structure of consciousness in Humean empiricism and that in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Allow me to put his understanding of the two in scenario: mind in Hume’s empiricism is made of simple impression and compound ideas according to the mechanistic law of association, and in Kant it consists in representations (die Vorstellungen) plus their possible condition, namely, the reflective self-consciousness. According to Kant’s definition in Critique (B377), conscious acts, belongs to the genus of representation, are named perception; under perception there is sensation, which solely related to the modification of subjective states, and those related to object, namely, intuition (which immediately related to it) and concept (which mediately related to it). Chapter two concentrates on the contrast of signification in reflex arc, influenced by the methodology of classical physiology and Laplacean deterministic mechanics, and that in the intentional arc in a holistic manner, influenced by Gestalt psychology. Chapter three is focused on issues relevant to Descartes’ cogito, a philosophical task set up by Léon Brunschvicg; in the mean time, Merleau-Ponty has to sieve out the improper elements—such as representation, analytical reflection, formalism in judgment, and positing activity—in Kant’s philosophy. (But he still attributes the discovery of for-itself to Kant.) In the Preface of Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty mentioned that “Descartes and particularly Kant detached the subject” (PP, ix). He also distinguished different style of reflection by mentioning that “Husserl’s transcendental is not Kant’s” (PP, xiii). In sum, how to create the transcendental attitude that is necessary for cogito of Husserl’s phenomenology is much more complex than he thought in this period. In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty said: “what I call the tacit cogito [in Phenomenology] is impossible” (VI, 170-1) The final chapter discusses Gurwitsch’s doubt about, namely, whether Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology conforms to Husserl’s tenet, if the notion of noema was not mentioned in Phenomenology. The present author argues that what Merleau-Ponty has done in Phenomenology is just a kind of the noematic reflection (PP, x) he set up for himself in the Preface, therefore, it seems to me that Gurwitsch’s doubt is a nominal accusation. This noematic reflection is done through the analysis of le sens that orients (or directs) consciousness towards the intentional objects through sense (understood both as sense-organ and meaning or intelligibility of object). [French word le sens has three meaning: direction, sense-organ, and meaning, as acknowledged by Merleau-Ponty himself in Phenomenology]. I conclude this article with the trigonal pyramid that symbolizes four related nodes in the ontological structure of intentionality in Phenomenology, namely, subject, object, others, and Nature.