The Argument from Object Illusion and a Novel Defense for Direct Realism
Date Issued
2008
Date
2008
Author(s)
Liu, Hsien-Chieh
Abstract
Direct realists claim that, we can at least sometimes directly perceive the external world. But the argument from illusion draws a serious threat. The argument is so striking that a lot of philosophers have been trying hard to defend direct realism. In traditional discussions, when we are struggling an illusion, we directly perceive an ordinary physical object as having a property which it doesn’t actually have. I think, however, there could be another kind of illusions which are more radical. When we are struggling those radical illusions, we directly perceive something else rather than the ordinary physical object having a illusory property. A new argument from illusion, which I shall call the argument from object illusion, could rise from those more radical illusions. In my opinion, philosophers have yet paid any attention to those radical illusions neither to the argument from object illusion. In the first chapter of this thesis, I will start with introducing the general features of perceptual experiences. In chapter two, I will introduce the traditional argument from illusion and how A. D. Smith and Alva Noë defend directly realism. Also in chapter two, I will show how their responses fail. In chapter three, I will introduce the argument from object illusion and show why Smith and Noë have no way to respond to the argument from object illusion. In chapter four, I will posit a novel defense for direct realism
Subjects
The argument from illusion
direct realism
indirect realism
sense data
perception
Type
thesis
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