Physicalism and Qualia
|Issue Date:||Jan-1990||Start page/Pages:||161-184||Source:||國立臺灣大學哲學論評||Abstract:||
Any reductive analysis of the mental cannot captural the subjective character of experience. So the qualia is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of physical states. This paper includes three parts.
1. T. Nagel's what it is like argument' and F. Jackson's 'knowledge argument' argue that physicalism cannot give any explanation of the subjective qualities of our experiences and any physical informations cannot explain what red looks like.
2. An analysis and critique of the defenses of physicalism.
3. The argument against physicalism (identity theory) is an invalid argument.
|Appears in Collections:||哲學系|
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