https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/22443
標題: | 物理論與感值 Physicalism and Qualia |
作者: | 黃懿梅 Huang, Y.M. |
公開日期: | 一月-1990 | 期: | 13 | 起(迄)頁: | 161-184 | 來源出版物: | 國立臺灣大學哲學論評 | 摘要: | Any reductive analysis of the mental cannot captural the subjective character of experience. So the qualia is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of physical states. This paper includes three parts. 1. T. Nagel's what it is like argument' and F. Jackson's 'knowledge argument' argue that physicalism cannot give any explanation of the subjective qualities of our experiences and any physical informations cannot explain what red looks like. 2. An analysis and critique of the defenses of physicalism. 3. The argument against physicalism (identity theory) is an invalid argument. |
URI: | http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/281964 |
顯示於: | 哲學系 |
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