Credit-Token Based Inter-Cell Radio Resource Management: A Game Theoretic Approach
Journal
The Sixth International Conference on Heterogeneous Networking for Quality, Reliability, Security and Robustness (QShine 2009)
Pages
663-678
Date Issued
2009-11
Author(s)
Abstract
In this paper, a radio resource sharing scheme for wireless cellular network is investigated to achieve efficiency and fairness among base stations. We propose a credit-token based spectrum sharing algorithm. Game theory is utilized to formulate and analyze the proposed spectrum sharing algorithm. We first discuss the simplest two-base-station game through a graphical method to gain insights for the solution. Afterwards, the Nash Equilibrium of the n-base-station game is derived and the spectrum allocation at the Nash equilibrium is shown to be unique. Several desirable properties, including allocative efficiency, Pareto optimality, weighted max-min fairness, and weighted proportional fairness, are proved to be attained at the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we design a strategy-proof spectrum allocation mechanism based on the proposed spectrum sharing algorithm so that truthful declarations of spectrum demands maximize the performance in each cell. © Institute for Computer Science, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2009.
In this paper, a radio resource sharing scheme for wireless cellular network is investigated to achieve efficiency and fairness among base stations. We propose a credit-token based spectrum sharing algorithm. Game theory is utilized to formulate and analyze the proposed spectrum sharing algorithm. We first discuss the simplest two-base-station game through a graphical method to gain insights for the solution. Afterwards, the Nash Equilibrium of the n-base-station game is derived and the spectrum allocation at the Nash equilibrium is shown to be unique. Several desirable properties, including allocative efficiency, Pareto optimality, weighted max-min fairness, and weighted proportional fairness, are proved to be attained at the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we design a strategy-proof spectrum allocation mechanism based on the proposed spectrum sharing algorithm so that truthful declarations of spectrum demands maximize the performance in each cell. © Institute for Computer Science, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2009.
SDGs
Type
conference paper