https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/414956
Title: | Short-Termist CEO Compensation in Speculative Markets: A Controlled Experiment | Authors: | YEN-CHENG CHANG Minjie Huang Yu-Siang Su Kevin Tseng |
Issue Date: | 28-Jun-2019 | Source: | 31st Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2018 | Abstract: | In Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006), existing shareholders use compensation contracts to encourage short-termism when stock prices are speculative, due to investor disagreement and short-sale constraints. Supporting this view, we find an exogenous removal of short-sale constraints curbs short-termist incentives as measured by longer CEO compensation duration. This effect is concentrated among stocks with high investor disagreement and short-term-oriented institutional ownership. We also find that longer CEO compensation duration leads to longer CEO investment horizon, less overinvestment, and less earnings management. |
Description: | --CICF (Tianjin), AsianFA (Tokyo), AFBC (Sydney), TFA (Taipei), MFA (San Antonio), Paris Financial Management (Paris), SFM (Taiwan) --Best Paper Award, TFA (Taipei, Taiwan) --R&R, Contemporary Accounting Research |
URI: | https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/414956 | DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.3002525 |
Appears in Collections: | 財務金融學系 |
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