|Title:||Bank management expertise and asset securitization policies||Authors:||HSIEN-HSING LIAO
Ye, Jing Syuan
Chen, Tsung Kang
|Keywords:||Asset securitization | Bank holding companies | Internal liquidity | Management team expertise | Risk management quality||Issue Date:||1-Dec-2019||Journal Volume:||109||Source:||Journal of Banking and Finance||Abstract:||
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. We explore how the expertise of a bank holding company's management team affects its asset securitization policies. We find management team members with an MBA degree and top management experience securitize more low risk loans while those with core functional executive positions securitize fewer high risk loans. In addition, internal liquidity, governance quality, and risk management quality moderate these effects. Moreover, risk management concerns are the main driver of the negative effect of the percentage of core functional executives on asset securitization. We also provide evidence that core functional executives deem securitized mortgage loans riskier after the subprime crisis.
|Appears in Collections:||財務金融學系|
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.