https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/54328
標題: | 反傾銷、價格具結與外人直接投資 Antidumping Policy, Price-undertaking and FDI |
作者: | 彭正浩 黃鴻 Peng, C.H. Hwang, H. |
關鍵字: | 反傾銷保護;外人直接投資;價格具結;antidumping protection;foreign direct investment;price-undertaking | 公開日期: | 十二月-2008 | 卷: | 36 | 期: | 4 | 起(迄)頁: | 463-481 | 來源出版物: | 經濟論文叢刊 | 摘要: | 本文以Hwang and Mai (1990)之兩國兩市場模型(亦稱?barbell模型,意指本國與外國市場分別位於線性市場的兩端),討論本國之反傾銷政策如何影響外國受政策限制廠商之對外直接投資(FDI)決策。本文異於以往之文獻在於將外國廠商的FDI策略(亦即外國廠商之區位選擇)設定?內生且連續的選擇變數,藉以通盤瞭解反傾銷政策對外國廠商區選位擇模式的影響。本文發現只要FDI的固定成本不高,本國政府之反傾銷政策一定會導致外國廠商從事FDI。此一發現與Blonigen (2002)的實證結果相吻合。此外,外國廠商之邊際成本愈高愈有可能從事FDI。此一結果與一般探討FDI之文獻(如:Melitz (2003))所得之結果相反。 This paper employs the barbell model ? la Hwang and Mai (1990) with one foreign and one domestic market existing at the two ends of a line market. There is one foreign firm competing with one domestic firm in the domestic market. We shall examine how an antidumping policy affects the FDI decision of the foreign constrained firm. This goes beyond previous studies by treating the FDI decision (i.e., the location of the foreign firm) as an endogenous and continuous variable which allows us to examine thoroughly the location pattern of the foreign firm. Our main findings are as follows: (i) If the fixed cost of FDI is not high, the foreign firm will definitely engage in FDI when it is subject to an antidumping policy. This result is in support of the empirical finding of Blonigen (2002). (ii) The foreign firm with a higher marginal cost is more likely to engage in FDI, if constrained by an antidumping policy. This result is contrary to those prevailing in the FDI literature in the absence of antidumping constraints, e.g., Melitz (2003). |
URI: | http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/282122 |
顯示於: | 經濟學系 |
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