The Optimal Government Shareholdings in Public Enterprises in the Process of Privatization
|Keywords:||公營廠商;民營化;最適持股;public enterprise;privatization;optimal shareholdings||Issue Date:||Jun-2006||Journal Volume:||34||Journal Issue:||2||Start page/Pages:||245-259||Source:||經濟論文叢刊||Abstract:||
本文主要的目的在於探討公營廠商民營化過程中的最適釋股比例。假設市場上存有國內外民營廠商、它們的邊際成本皆屬固定、廠商間從事Cournot數量競爭，本文發現惟有當本國公營廠商的生產效率比民營廠商差時，政府才應將公營廠商民營化，此一結果與文獻上普遍假設廠商邊際成本為遞增時之結果（如De Fraja 1991或Matsumura 1998）有顯著之差異。此外，本文亦發現當本國民營廠商數越多時，最適的民營化釋股比例應越高；惟有當本國民營廠商數甚多時，外國廠商數增加才會使最適的民營化最適釋股比例降低。在本國民營廠商可以自由進出市場的情況下，本國民營廠商的家數會隨著公營廠商民營化程度之提高而增加。
Governments usually hold stock in public enterprises that are in the process of privatization in order to preserve control when the government needs to intervene. The aim of this paper is to find the socially optimal government stock shares in the privatization process. We consider a market with a public enterprise and many domestic and foreign private firms. The marginal cost of firms is assumed to be constant. The main findings are as follows. Privatization is needed only when the production of the public enterprise is less efficient than that of private firms. This is in contrast to the findings of De Fraja (1991) and Matsumura (1998) that the public enterprise should privatize even when firms have identical cost structures. The government should reduce its stock holding in the public enterprise when the number of domestic private firms increases. However, if the number of domestic private firms is sufficiently large, the government should raise its stake in the public enterprise when the number of foreign private firms increases. Furthermore, with free entry and exit for domestic firms, the number of domestic private firms will increase as the degree of privatization increases.
|Appears in Collections:||經濟學系|
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.