DRAM產業競合策略之研究─ 德商英飛凌與南亞科個案探討

Abstract

DRAM產業競合策略之研究─ 德商英飛凌與南亞科個案探討

研究生：曾守億 指導教授：郭震坤 博士 學號 : P92744019 陳國泰 博士

國立台灣大學EMBA 會計與管理決策研究所 碩士班

摘要 隨著全球DRAM市場逐漸由三星(Samsung)、海力士(Hynix)、美光(Micron)、英飛凌(Infineon)及爾必達(Elpida)等5大集團所控制，產業特性已從往昔的劇烈變動慢慢趨於穩定。在這樣的變遷過程中，台灣廠商憑藉本身的製造成本及財務操作優勢，分別以技術授權或策略聯盟的方式與前幾大廠商合作，而成為5大集團中的成員。但在溝渠式(Trench)陣營中，龍頭廠商英飛凌由於面臨2001年以來因鉅額虧損造成資金缺口持續擴大的經營壓力，不得不開始思索是否要切割其記憶體事業部門，以避免其他事業的利潤遭侵蝕。在英飛凌決定是否切割其DRAM記憶體事業部門的決策中，對與英飛凌合作關係密切的南亞科而言，無異亦面臨了經營的決策點。英飛凌是否會堅持以公開上市(IPO)的方式處理其DRAM事業部，或是找尋合適的交易對象而出售其DRAM事業部？南亞科在英飛凌思索的過程中，是否應採行保守的態度固守現況，或是積極併購英飛凌的DRAM事業部以鞏固其技術來源。不同的決策互動對雙方均有其利與弊，同時該結果又會對DRAM溝渠式陣營造成衝擊。本研究欲針對英飛凌與南亞科之間策略互動的結果進行分析，並評估其最終結果發生的可能性。 本研究所採用的研究方法是透過「Nash談判模型」、「子賽局完美均衡」與「完全訊息動態賽局分析」，分析英飛凌與南亞科之間的策略互動關係，並探討最終可能產生的均衡解，最後以「NPV法及敏感度分析」針對最終的均衡解進行評估。藉由本研究的研究方法可發現，雙方的均衡解會隨著決策情境的不同而有所改變，當英飛凌傾向固守其DRAM市場時，英飛凌會以公開上市處理其DRAM事業部；當DRAM市場不看好時，英飛凌則會傾向以低價出售其DRAM事業部，南亞科亦會積極併購英飛凌的DRAM事業部。對於不同情境的均衡解，可藉由「NPV法及敏感度分析」探討英飛凌的公開上市的機會成本及南亞科併購的最低成本。考量研究結果及市場現況，本研究認為2006年英飛凌將傾向「公開上市」處理其分割出來的記憶體事業新公司，一方面可鞏固其技術領先地位，亦可趁全球DRAM大廠陸續退出DRAM市場之際，一舉擴大其DRAM市場。

關鍵字：DRAM、Nash談判模型、子賽局完美均衡(SPNE)、動態賽局分析、淨現值法及敏感度分析

Abstract As the global DRAM market gradually dominated by five major groups: Samsung, Infineon, Hynix, Micron and Elpida, the DRAM industry seems more stable and predictable. In this industry, Taiwanese DRAM makers take advantages on low-cost manufacturing and fine financial planning in its cooperation with the five major groups, basically through technology licensing or strategic alliance. In the DRAM trench alliance, current technology leader, Infineon, would be forced to sell her DRAM department to avoid the continuing losses. Whatever strategy Infineon may take will affect her close partner, Nanya. In the end, Nanya will face a decision point due to Infineon’s strategy. As Infineon takes “IPO” or “Sell in low price” to deal with her DRAM department, what would Nanya do? The interaction between them will have extensive impacts on the global DRAM market. This thesis is aimed to analyze the strategical interaction between Infineon and Nanya, and further assess the impact of their strategies to the global DRAM market. To deal with these problems, this thesis uses the “Nash bargaining solution” (NBS) and “Dynamic game” to analyze the strategical interaction between Infineon and Nanya, and find the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of the dynamic game between Infineon and Nanya. Further, the “NPV & Sensitivity analysis” is used to assess if the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is feasible. Based on the results of the study, this thesis obtains two conclusions in two scenarios. One scenario is that Infineon would defend her DRAM market. In this scenario, the SPNE is that Infineon would take IPO, and Nanya would have status quo. The other scenario is that Infineon would withdraw from her DRAM market. In this scenario, the SPNE is that Infineon would sell her DRAM department in low price, and Nanya would choose to merge it. Finally, using the “NPV & Sensitivity analysis”, this thesis concludes that Infineon would tend to IPO because Infineon could keep the leadership in trench technology alliance and then expand her DRAM market share instead of withdrawing from the DRAM market.

Keyword: DRAM, Nash Bargaining Solution(NBS), Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) and, Dynamic game, Net Present Value(NPV) & Sensitivity analysis