SHENG-SYAN CHENChou, RKRKChouLee, YCYCLee2023-05-162023-05-1620200924-865Xhttps://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/631090We show that corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in controlling managers’ opportunistic behavior. Low executive equity compensation and a high intensity of outside monitoring help to discourage undesirable self-interested disclosure decisions by management before share repurchases. Corporate governance mechanisms also have a significant impact on long-run abnormal stock prices and operating performance. Firms that manipulate pre-repurchase disclosures experience positive long-term abnormal stock returns. However, we do not find that these firms experience positive long-run operating performance. Corporate governance mechanisms significantly attenuate the tendency toward negative pre-repurchase disclosures and their effects on stock prices and operating performance.enCorporate governance; Repurchase; Voluntary disclosure; Long-term performance; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; OFFICER COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; ANALYST COVERAGE; AGENCY COSTS; MARKET; DIRECTORS; OWNERSHIPjournal article10.1007/s11156-018-00785-12-s2.0-85059305420WOS:000511735100005https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85059305420