2014-08-012024-05-17https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/695917摘要：自2010年希臘發生債務危機，且於2012年升溫並引發歐元區內連鎖效應以來，歐債問題一直是我國財經當局持續關注的國際金融重大隱患。近來部份歐元區領袖發表樂觀看法，認為持續四年的歐元區債務危機「已經結束」，然而相關定義與說法似乎仍不能被廣泛接受。本研究案的目的，在於延伸既有研究成果並使用新近發展的計量方法，討論以下二個關鍵問題：一是分析在歷經金融海嘯與歐債危機衝擊後，對於歐元區金融整合的損害有多大？在其他情況不變，且假設歐盟與歐元區當局沒有任何作為的情況下，若以時間作為成本考量因素，則金融整合的回復需要多少時日？藉此以定義歐債危機是否已經結束，並判斷危機完全終結所需要的作為與努力。二是根據上述結論，分析其他歐元區候選成員國 (例如波蘭、匈牙利與捷克) 加入歐元區的可能性，進而對歐元區擴張與未來發展前景進行分析。申請人認為本研究仍是一個新的議題，國內外相關學術與政策研究仍少，就學術與實務的觀點而言，應具重要性與急迫性。<br> Abstract: Before 2007-08, the European Monetary Union was expected to be enlarged on schedule. Most Eastern European countries were optimistic and aggressive about becoming the EMU members. Several Central and Eastern European countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, planned to join the euro area in 2012 and 2010, respectively (Yeh 2007). But the European sovereign debt problem triggered by the U.S. sub-prime crisis not only revealed the EMU’s fiscal coordination failure, but also weakened regional financial integration that makes members more vulnerable in asymmetric shocks, despite the great success of monetary policy at the level of the euro area. The stagnation of financial integration will therefore increase the cost of sustaining a monetary union, which in turn slows EMU enlargement and then ruins the reputation of the euro. A good news is that in 2014 Latvia will be a new member of the EMU, but the problem is about the big three in CEEs: Poland has claimed that the euro will not be launched before 2015. The entry of Hungary also has been postponed to 2020. The Czech Republic even refused to sign the Fiscal Compact Treaty which has been agreed by other 25 EU members in March 2012. On the basis of Lin and Yeh (2013), the purpose of this paper is to measure the damages to financial integration between the EMU and its main accession candidates caused by the European sovereign debt crisis since 2010. We use the log t test by Phillips and Sul (2007) to provide a more precise answer on RIP convergence than the traditional unit root test. Further, we extend Lin and Yeh (2013) to predict the timing of a steady RIP convergence, which measures the cost of time to achieve financial integration caused by the sovereign debt crisis between the EMU and its main accession candidates. We expect that the convergent speed could be slower than the prediction by Lin and Yeh (2013), which indicates a steady RIP convergence will not be achieved until 2030. This implies the EMU authority must strengthen regional financial integration to solidify the EMU, and then be able to re-start enlargement.變異數收斂歐元區歐債危機金融整合log t testEMU enlargementEuropean sovereign crisisfinancial integration