2004-08-012024-05-15https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/666034摘要：本研究計劃旨在分析不同創投契約對抑制興業家操控行為效果。我們採用一訊息不對稱下、創投家分階段逐步增加投資的模型，預期在相當一般化的情況下，創投金主恐無法藉由對可轉換特別股或是可轉換公司債券訂定一合適轉換比率，消除盈餘操控; 此時或許須藉助可轉換特別股的多重轉換比率設定，以抑制興業家之策略性行為。我們計劃中的設定有某些點將延伸及修正Cornelli and Yosha (2003)模型，惟主要訴求與主要模型將與其有顯著差異，倒不只是更加一般化而已。 首先，我們計劃設定興業家 (Entrepreneur; 以下簡作EN) 對創投計劃具備較創投家 (venture capitalist; 以下簡作VC) 更多訊息，我們考慮 EN盈餘操控並不局限於正向，多加入視情況而決定操控的方向及程度，給予較大的彈性去選擇人為操控方式(如他發現企業狀況甚佳，或許會作負向操縱以降低轉換機率)。我們也考慮可轉換特別股轉換成普通股對於獲利情況相當差的EN，其實有風險分擔的好處，形成EN作正向操縱誘因。這就可能要藉助可轉換特別股的多重轉換比率設定。 本計劃預期完成之工作項目涵括： (1)在三個創投契約<br> Abstract: This research project aims at analyzing the effectiveness of various venture capital contracts in mitigating an entrepreneur’s earnings manipulation. Under a setting with information asymmetry, we plan to adopt a model for a venture capitalist’s staged financing scheme and illustrate that there may exist no optimal conversion ratio for the convertible preferred shares/convertible bonds that can prevent entrepreneurs’ manipulation. We plan to revise and extend the model of Cornelli and Yosha (2003) for our differential but more generalized setting. In our proposed setting, an entrepreneur (EN) is better informed than a venture capitalist (VC) regarding the venture project. Our proposal, nevertheless, is in contrast with the recent analytical studies, which assume that EN can boost but cannot lower the reported earnings. Instead, in our more generalized setting, EN may choose various contrived manipulation to affect the distribution form of the signal and thus may affect both sign and level of the noise in the earnings measure reported to VC. Accordingly, the venture capitalist may need to use convertible preferred shares with multiple conversion ratios to restrain entrepreneurs’ strategic behavior. The proposed objects in the study include the followings: (1)Under three different venture capital contract types (financing with bonds and stocks, convertible preferred shares/convertible bonds with single conversion ratio, and convertible preferred shares with two or multiple conversion ratios), we plan to analyze the incentive inducements of EN’s manipulation. (2)We plan to investigate the effect of EN’s manipulation behavior in terms of the social welfare residue. (3)We aim at exploring the conditions under which convertible preferred shares/convertible bonds with single conversion ratio may be ineffective in mitigating upward or downward bias in the reproted earnings.可轉換證券多重轉換比率逐步融資創業投資操控Convertible SecuritiesMultiple Conversion RatiosStage FinancingVenture CapitalManipulation