陳聖賢Chen, Sheng-Syan臺灣大學:財務金融學研究所徐百加Hsu, Bai-JiaBai-JiaHsu2010-05-112018-07-092010-05-112018-07-092008U0001-1607200822200200http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/182586此篇論文探討在公司價值錯估理論下，使用併購提議前的評價來判斷公司的併購動機。過去文獻認為併購動機主要分為綜效假說、代理假說和傲慢假說。我們以目標公司報酬和總報酬的相關性，以及目標公司報酬和主併公司報酬的相關性來區分此三種假說。本論文發現主併公司的股票評價與付款方式和併購動機有關:股價被高估的公司會傾向使用換股作為付款方式並且其併購動機支持代理假說，因此本論文提供股票錯估理論的證據。This paper uses pre-offer market valuations to evaluate motivation for takeovers under misvaluation theory. According to previous literature, the motives for merger and acquisition consist of synergy, agency, and hubris. We distinguish three hypotheses by looking at the correlation between target and both acquirer wealth gains and total wealth gains. We found bidder valuations are related to means of payment and the motivation of merger, overvalued (higher P/B) bidders incline to merge by stock and have agency problem, provides evidence for the misvaluation hypothesis.I. Introduction 1I. Literature Review and Hypothesis 3II. Data and Methodology 11V. Univariate Test 18. Multivariate Test 26I. Conclusion 30eferences 40application/pdf402697 bytesapplication/pdfen-US公司價值錯估理論併購動機綜效假說代理假說傲慢假說misvaluationmerger motivationsynergyagencyhubristhesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/182586/1/ntu-97-R95723018-1.pdf