李存修臺灣大學：財務金融學研究所陳昱如Chen, Yu-JuYu-JuChen2007-11-282018-07-092007-11-282018-07-092004http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/60805　　「員工分紅配股」是台灣業界普遍施行的一種薪酬制度。雇主期望能藉由分紅配股來激勵員工，以進而提升公司的生產及獲利能力。但是因為員工分紅配股會導致嚴重的稀釋效果，有損小股東的權益，因此近年來各種負面評論紛紛出現。 　　本研究試圖探討公司在施行員工分紅配股上的決策與公司治理構面之間的關係，期望了解大股東是否利用員工分紅配股制做為圖利自己，剝削小股東的手段。根據本篇實證結果，當最大股東的控制力越高、最大股東的現金權越高、控制權與現金權偏離的程度越高、以及外資持股越多時，公司會傾向使用較少的員工股票分紅。而當越多董事成員參與員工分紅時，公司則傾向使用較多的員工股票分紅。　Employee stock bonus program in Taiwan is designed as a device to tie employees’ interests and firm’s interests together. Although it is generally believed that employee stock bonus has an incentive effect that can potentially enhance firm’s productivity and profitability to some degree, there are increasing dissatisfied voices appearing in recent years due to the serious dilution effect. In this study, we try to investigate the connection between firm’s using extent of employee stock bonus and the corporate governance mechanism. 　The empirical evidences indicate that corporate governance does influence the adoption of employee stock bonus. The percentage of control-affiliated directors, the joint CEO-chairman factor, the controlling shareholder’s cash flow right, the deviation from control right to cash flow right, and the foreign ownership all present remarkably negative impacts on the use of employee stock bonus. Besides, the participation of board members in employees’ profit sharing reinforces the approval of employee stock bonus.I. Introduction 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 2 II. Hypotheses Development 　　　　　　　　　　 8 III. Data 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 10 3.1 　Sample selection 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 10 3.2 　Assumptions for data collection 11 3.3 　Variables Descriptions 12 3.3.1 　Dependent Variables 14 3.3.2 　Independent Variables (Corporate Governance Variables) 15 3.3.3 　Control Variables 18 3.4 　Descriptive Statistics 20 IV. Analysis on Regression Results 24 V. Two-Sample Analysis 27 5.1 　Two-Sample classifying with 20% control right 27 5.1.1 　Two-Sample Mean Test 28 5.1.2 　Regression results of Group A and Group B 30 5.2 　Two-Sample classifying with 50% control-affiliated directors 34 5.2.1 　Two-Sample Mean Test 34 5.2.2 　Regression results of Group X and Group Y 36 VI. Conclusions 39 References 41252101 bytesapplication/pdfen-US股票分紅公司治理員工分紅分紅入股corporate governanceprofit sharingthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/60805/1/ntu-93-R91723004-1.pdf