荷世平臺灣大學：土木工程學研究所湯立宇Tang, Li-YuLi-YuTang2007-11-252018-07-092007-11-252018-07-092004http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/50283各項民間參與公共建設之實務案例中，政府時常利用稅賦減免與各項附屬權利，例如土地開發或是其他特釣こ~範圍以外之事業經營權利，做為機制設計之工具，用以提升特頃t商之預期自償率，藉此政府即可增強民間參與之意願。然而，若要探討這些機制的激勵效果或是政策效率，則必須量化地考量這些減免與權利的廠商主觀價值。在評選機制中忽略這些機制的影響與含意，往往會造成特頃t商評選之偏誤。 本研究針對民間參與公共建設附屬土地開發權利，利用資產訂價理論、關卡選擇權理論、機制設計流程、實質選擇權理論，建立「附屬土地開發權利」主觀價值與機制效果之量化分析模型，並藉此模型說明附屬權利之經濟意義，以及進一步分析特頃t商與融資銀行之間的最適專案融資契約。In the executed projects of BOT╱BOO╱OT, the Government often employs tax-reducing and many kinds of associated businesses, such as land-development or business-operating-right beyond the concession, as tools of auction mechanism design. By means of these tools, the Government can heighten the expected payback ratio and strengthen the aspiration of private companies to involve in public works and services. However, people cannot probe into the motivating effects or policy efficiency without valuing the concessionaire’s subjective values of these tax-reducing or saaociated businesses quantificationally. To leave these effects out of consideration may cause serious bias during auction process. My dissertation focuses on the case of BOT projects with land-development as the associated business, and applies the Asset Pricing Theory, Barrier Option Theory, Mechanism Design Approach, and Real Option Theory to set up a quantificational model to analyzing the subjective value and mechanism effect of ‘with land-development as the associated business.’ I will also discuss the economical meanings of the mechanism of the associated business and analyses further about the optimal project-financing contract between the concessionaire and the lender.誌謝…………………………………………………………………………………..Ⅰ 摘要…………………………………………………………………………………..Ⅱ Abstract………………………………………………………………………………Ⅲ 目錄…………………………………………………………………………………..Ⅳ 表目錄………………………………………………………………………………..Ⅵ 圖目錄………………………………………………………………………………..Ⅶ 第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………………..……..1 1.1研究背景與動機………………………………………………………………..1 1.2研究目的與方法………………………………………………………………..3 1.3研究範圍………………………………………………………………………..5 1.4研究流程………………………………………………………………………..6 第二章 文獻回顧……………………………………………………………………9 2.1選擇權訂價理論與關卡選擇權理論………………………………………….11 2.2實質投資不確定性分析理論………………………………………………….16 2.3傳訊賽局與機制設計理論…………………………………………………….20 2.4民間參與公共建設BOT模式…………………………………………………23 2.5公有土地民間開發模式……………………………………………………….25 2.6民間參與公共建設BOT模式附屬土地開發權利性質………………………28 第三章 實質選擇權分析模型……………………………………………………..30 3.1資產訂價與折問題概述……………………………………………………….31 3.2市場價值與主觀價值評價體系之關卡值…………………………………….40 3.3附屬土地開發權利市場價與主觀價值分析模型…………………………….52 3.4市場價值與主觀價值之分析與比較………………………………………….66 3.5本章小結……………………………………………………………………….88 第四章 最適融資機制設計分析模型……………………………………………..91 4.1最適融資機制設計問題概述……………………………………………….…91 4.2最適融資契約機制模型之建構與探討…………………………………….…94 4.3本章小結……………………………………………………………………..111 第五章 結論與後續研究建構……………………………………………………114 5.1結論…………………………………………………………………………...114 5.2研究貢獻……………………………………………………………………...120 5.3後續研究建議………………………………………………………………..121 參考文獻……………………………………………………………………………122 附錄A……………………………………………………………………………….1291550773 bytesapplication/pdfen-US關卡選擇權理論民間參與公共建設機制設計資產訂價理論實質選擇權理論BOT╱BOO╱OTMechanism DesignBarrier Option TheoryAsset Pricing TheoryReal Option Theorythesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/50283/1/ntu-93-R91521702-1.pdf