SHENG-SYAN CHENHuang, Chia WeiChia WeiHuang2023-05-172023-05-172013-0100221090https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/631114We examine how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) affects pre-repurchase earnings management and its association with post-repurchase firm performance. Unlike prior pre-SOX studies, our post-SOX results indicate that open-market repurchasers do not engage in pre-buyback downward accrual-based earnings management. Audit committee independence, reforms in corporate governance structures, and changes in executives' equity holdings prompted by SOX may explain the findings. Post-SOX, the significant negative association between pre-repurchase abnormal accruals and post-repurchase performance disappears, the market reaction to repurchase announcements becomes significantly less favorable, and there is no evidence of any shift away from accrual-based to real earnings management. Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2013.enFINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS; OPERATING PERFORMANCE; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; STOCK REPURCHASES; TENDER OFFERS; CONSEQUENCES; INFORMATION; DIRECTORS; REAL; CASHjournal article10.1017/S00221090140000402-s2.0-84900549625WOS:000336519400007https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84900549625