Yen J.-F.Chen Y.-S.Lin C.-Y.Tsai C.-H.2019-07-242019-07-24201413504851https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/414653This article examines the relationship between political and business connections (PBCs) and firms' financial constraints. We proxy a firm's PBCs by whether or not the firm's CEO should hold a directorship in major trade organizations. Using an endogenous switching regression model, we find that firms with a connected CEO are less likely to be classified as financially constrained firms. Our results can provide a possible explanation why firms allow their CEOs to hold directorships in trade associations. ? 2014 Taylor & Francis.directorshipsfinancial constraintspolitical and business connectionstrade associationsjournal article10.1080/13504851.2013.8750992-s2.0-84895759295https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84895759295&doi=10.1080%2f13504851.2013.875099&partnerID=40&md5=da9cfaa75f8506451875c06dc6de9564