湯明哲2006-07-262018-06-292006-07-262018-06-291999http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/16988過去文獻上有關於廠商的產能擴充 策略對市場競爭的效果，大都由進入阻 絕理論(Entry Deterrence Theory)來著 手，強調廠商藉由超額產能之持有來阻 絕潛在進入者之進入。本研究由重複賽 局模式之策略互動理論角度，來探討廠 商如何利用策略性產能承諾，來和其它 現有競爭對手及潛在進入者進行競爭或 合作。在實證方面，主要是蒐集石化與 半導體產品生產廠商之相關資料進行統 計分析。結果顯示產能擴充猜測變量是 判斷現有廠商策略互動型態的良好指 標，且產能擴充投資行為是廠商遂行暗 中式勾結的有效工具之一，尤其在高產 品同質性或高沉沒成本時，產能擴充行為之合作協調效果更佳。Previous research on capacity strategies can be classified into two streams. The first stream of research focuses on deterring entry by excess capacity, and the second stream concentrates on using capacity expansion as a collusive device. Previous literature, however, largely focused on theoretical development of the concept on strategic interaction. Large scale empirical studies on conjectures on both capacity and competitive dynamics are still missing. This research intends to use capacity conjectures to examine strategies employed by incumbents in the chemical and semiconductor industries to shed lights on the competition in these two industries. We can observe that conjectures of capacity shows a negative and significant impact on market share instability. In other words, firms tend to use capacity to collude and thus reduce market share changes. We also find that market growth increases market share instability. As expected, we also find that product homogeneity reduces market share instability while high sunk cost also reduces it.application/pdf31531 bytesapplication/pdfzh-TW國立臺灣大學國際企業學系暨研究所策略性產能承諾產能擴充猜測變量策略互動Strategic CommitmentConjectural Variation on Capacity ExpansionStrategic Interactionreporthttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/16988/1/872416H002016.pdf