社會科學院: 經濟學研究所指導教授: 金善鐸唐恩信Tang, En-seenEn-seenTang2017-03-032018-06-282017-03-032018-06-282015http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/275251我們用經濟學實驗來檢驗提案優勢在 Baron-Ferejohn 議價模型中如何變動。提案優勢定義為提案者的分配利益減去最小聯盟成員其中一位的分配利益。如同文獻探討過的，我們發現提案優勢比理論預測值小。跟理論一致的是，提案優勢隨著折現因子增加而減少；相較於在一致通過表決規則，在簡單多數決中提案優勢比較大。最後，我們比較了直接反映方法與策略式方法兩個不同的實驗數據，只有在當折現因子高的時候，兩方法產生的提案優勢差異才會不顯著，這個結果部分支持實驗文獻中關於兩者的比較。We examine how proposal power, measured by proposer share minus the share of a coalition member, varies in Baron-Ferejohn bargaining model with laboratory experiments. As in the literature, we find that proposal power is smaller than what the model predicts. But consistent with the theory, proposal power decreases in the discount factor and shows greater under simple majority than unanimity rule. Last but not least, the experimental difference between the direct-response method and the strategy method on proposal power is not significant only when the discount factor is high, which is a mixed support for other studies of such comparison.985591 bytesapplication/pdf論文公開時間: 2016/3/16論文使用權限: 同意有償授權(權利金給回饋學校)實驗經濟政策議價提案優勢簡單多數決一致同意決策略式實驗方法Laboratory ExperimentLegislative BargainingProposal PowerMinimum CoalitionMajorityUnanimityStrategy Methodthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/275251/1/ntu-104-R00323048-1.pdf