國立臺灣大學政治學系暨研究所陳世民2006-07-252018-06-282006-07-252018-06-282003-07-31http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/13815ABM 條約體制的瓦解最令人擔心的一可能影響便是攻、防武器的軍備競賽， 而其中北京對此之可能反應乃一關鍵變數。長期以來中共一再警告，ABM 條約乃全球 裁武機制的基石，此基石若受損，北京將重新考量過去所做過的裁武承諾。其目前約 二十枚能攻擊到美國本土的洲際導彈可能大半被NMD 所抵銷，如此將使中共擔心美國 是否將因NMD 的部署，而獲致對中共發動第一擊的實力，使中共再度須面對其核武發 展初期的「預先手術式清除其核武」之威脅的可能性，這將對中共和美國的戰略關係 造成重大衝擊。若要避免此種威脅，中共似乎亦只有增加其核武數量一途而已。長期 以來，大陸具官方色彩的專家學者便多次指出NMD 將使中共增加其核武數量及研發多 彈頭導彈，而多項研究亦指出中共其實可以輕意地二、三倍其核武數量。雖然不少美 國學者指出美國即使不部署NMD，中共亦將繼續其核武現代化，然而中共長期以來的 核武發展政策乃重質不重量，倘若因NMD 而改採質量並進的政策，其核武數量的增長 對區域及國際安全仍將造成不小衝擊。尤其是由此所引發的骨牌效應，若因此予印度 增強其核武實力的藉口，亦將使巴基斯坦跟進。而日本、北韓、南韓亦可能出現此效 應。 此一如何「維繫全球戰略穩定」之思維的重大轉變對國際安全的影響不可謂 不鉅，這對依賴美國之安全承諾甚鉅的我國安全會造成怎樣的衝擊呢?如果ABM 條約 體制的瓦解導致中共增加其核武數量，並引起亞洲的核武軍備競賽及繁衍，這對我國 之戰略環境的影響實不容忽視。1996 年的台海飛彈危機時，面對美國派遣兩艘航空母 艦至台海，北京便曾向美國間接放話﹕「中共不相信美國對台北的重視，會勝過對洛 杉機的重視。」這自然是指中共核武對美國本土的威脅，而中共核武數量的增加，對 美國予臺灣之安全承諾的可信度當然會造成影響。然而，倘若美國的NMD 能大幅抵銷 中共核武對美國本土的威脅，這亦能使美國在履行其對台之安全承諾時，較不受北京 的核訛詐。這二者之關連將如何發展，乃日後應持續關注的重要問題。The most disturbing consequence of abrogation of the ABM treaty is that it could spark a new arms race in offensive and defensive weapons. For a long time, Beijing has warned that the ABM treaty is the cornerstone of desarmament regime and that if it is damaged they would rethink all previous undertakings on disarmament. The value of most of China’s roughly 20 intercontinental nuclear missiles capable of striking the U.S. could be nullified by NMD. This raises concern in Beijing that NMD deployment would grant the U.S. power to launch a first strike against China with relative impunity. It would also focus China’s attention on the threat that a pre-emptive attack could wipe out its nascent nuclear weapons development. Again, the strategic relationship between China and the U.S. would be upset. China could only stave off this kind of danger by expanding its nuclear arsenal. In the recent past, establishment scientists and academics in China have repeatedly commented that NMD would compel China to expand its nuclear arsenal and develop multiple warhead missiles and several studies have concluded that China could easily double or triple in size its nuclear arsenal. Many U.S. academics have noted that China will continue modernization of its nuclear forces even if NMD is not deployed. However, for a long time, China’s nuclear program has focused on upgrading the quality of its devices rather than increasing their number. If this policy is redirected towards increasing warhead numbers as a result of NMD, there will be a major impact on regional and international security. In particular there would be the danger of a domino effect: India may respond by expanding its nuclear capability, Pakistan could do the same. It is also possible that this domino effect happens in East Asia (between Japan, North Korea and South Korea). What will be this impact on Taiwan, which is heavily reliant on U.S. guarantees for its own security? If scrapping of the ABM treaty leads China to expand its nuclear arsenal and this sparks a nuclear arms race and proliferation in Asia, the effect on Taiwan’s strategic environment would be considerable. Around the time of the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis when the U.S. dispatched two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait, Beijing indirectly warned the U.S that China believed “you care a lot more about Los Angeles than Taipei.” This was of course a threat of a nuclear strike on U.S. soil. An increase in the number of Chinese missiles would naturally impact upon the credibility of U.S. security commitments to Taiwan. Nonetheless, if U.S. NMD could substantially reduce the threat of Chinese nuclear weapons to U.S. territory, the U.S. would be less susceptible to China’s nuclear blackmail when fulfilling its security commitments to Taiwan. Just how the relative likelihood of these two scenarios develops will be of most intimate concern to Taiwan in the future.application/pdf170419 bytesapplication/pdfzh-TW國立臺灣大學政治學系暨研究所飛彈防禦反彈道飛彈條約中共軍事嚇阻中美關係Missile DefenseABM TreatyChina’s DefenseDeterrenceSino-American Relation[SDGs]SDG16reporthttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/13815/1/912414H002026.pdf