陳聖賢臺灣大學:財務金融學研究所施懿宸Shih, Yi-ChnegYi-ChnegShih2010-05-112018-07-092010-05-112018-07-092009U0001-0805200916192000http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/182763Berger and Ofek (1995) 宣稱多角化公司比單一部門公司而言較無效率。Stein (2003) 歸納大部分解釋「多角化折價」的研究，認為「多角化折價」是由於公司內部資本在各部門間的無效率配置所產生。雖然之前的文獻提供很多實證結果解釋「多角化折價」，但是他們忽略管理品質與聲譽在「多角化折價」所扮演的角色。本篇研究提供健全的實證結果，發現當管理者的品質與聲譽愈好，愈能提升內部資本配置的效率進而改善「多角化折價」。在控制管理品質與聲譽的內生性問題，依然可以得到上述的實證證據。此外，本篇研究發現七個共同因子來衡量管理品質與聲譽，包含管理團隊的大小、管理團隊的任期、CEO之前的工作經驗、管理團隊的年齡、管理團隊的教育程度、管理團隊的專業、CEO的支配力。後，本研究的實證結果可以部分解釋 Lang and Stulz (1994)和Berger and Ofek(1995)所提出的「多角化折價之謎」。當管理者品質與聲譽較差將導致「多角化折價」的程度較Berger and Ofek (1995)的實證結果還大，反之，若管理者品質與聲譽較佳，則「多角化折價」的程度將比Berger and Ofek (1995)的實證結果。Berger and Ofek (1995) document that diversified firms are less efficient than comparable single-segment firms. As summarized by Stein (2003), one of most popular explanations for the “diversification discount” is the inefficient internal capital allocation across corporate divisions. Although the results in the previous literature are insightful, they do not consider the role of management quality and reputation in explaining the “diversification discount”. In this paper, I provide the robust empirical results to show that better management quality and reputation indeed enhance efficiencyf internal capital allocation of the diversified firms and furthermore, improve the diversification discount. After solving endogeneity of management quality andeputation, I still find the same empirical evidence. Besides, I also find seven common factors to measure management quality and reputation which include the management team size factor (MTS), the management team tenure factor (MTT), the CEO’s working experience factor (CEO_EXPERIENCE),the management team age factor (MTA), theanagement team education level factor (MTE), the management team professional factor (MTP) and the CEO’s dominance factor (CEO_DOMINANCE). Finally, the empirical results could explain partially the “diversification discount puzzle” that Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) provide. Managers with poor managementuality and reputation will bring about larger diversification discounts than Berger and Ofek (1995)’s empirical results. In contrast, managers with better management quality and reputation will result in smaller diversification discounts than Berger and Ofek (1995)’s empirical results.目 錄試委員會審定書 i謝 ii文摘要 iii文摘要 iv. Introduction 1I. Hypothesis Development 4II. The Determinants of Management Quality and Reputation on Investment Efficiency 7. Size of Management Team 7. Tenure of Top Management Team 9. CEO’s Working Experience 10. Age of Top Management Team 11. Education Level of Top Management Team 12. Professional of Top Management Team 13. CEO_Dominance 13V. Data and Sample Selection 14. Methodology 17. Factor Analysis 17. Measures of Management Quality and Reputation 17. Measures of Investment Efficiency 23. Measures of Excess Value 25I. Empirical Results 26. Investment Efficiency 26. Excess Value 28. Regression of Investment efficiency 29. Regression of Excess Value 30. Robustness 31. Endogeneity 32II. Conclusion 33eference 35ppendix 43ontents of Tableable I Sample Distributions 44able II Summary Statistics 45able III Factor Analysis 47igure 1 Eigenvalues 49able IV Investment Efficiency for Subsamples of the Diversified Firmsrouped by Management Quality and Reputation 50able V Investment efficiency for Subsamples of the Diversified Firmsrouped by Management Quality and Reputation and Tobin’s qr Free Cash Flow or Number of Segments (2X2 Dimensions) 51able VI Excess Value for Subsamples of the Diversified Firms Groupedy Management Quality and Reputation 57able VII Excess Value for Subsamples of the Diversified Firms Groupedy Management Quality and Reputation and Tobin’s q or Freeash Flow or Number of Segments (2X2 Dimensions) 58able VIII Regressions of Investment Efficiency and Excess Valuen Management Quality and Reputation 61able IX Regression without the repeated companies (only count oneime) in the sample 63able X Investment Efficiency for Subsamples of the Diversified Firmsrouped by Management Quality and Reputation and Priorear’s Firm Size, M/B, P/B, or ROE 65able XI Excess Value for Subsamples of the Diversified Firms Groupedy Management Quality and Reputation and Prior Year’s Firmize, M/B, P/B, or ROE 67able XII Three_Stage Regression 68application/pdf616389 bytesapplication/pdfen-US管理品質與聲譽公司多角化多角化折價高階管理團隊投資效率內部資本配置Management Quality and ReputationCorporate DiversificationDiversification DiscountTop Management TeamInvestments EfficiencyInternal Capital Allocationthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/182763/1/ntu-98-D93723004-1.pdf