湛可南2006-07-262018-07-092006-07-262018-07-092003http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/16274Previous studies have documented that the acquiring firms in mergers significantly underperform those in tender offers after acquisitions. Two hypotheses have been proposed to explain the poor post-acquisition stock performance of mergers: the method of payment (cash vs. stock) and book-to-market effect (value vs. growth firms). This paper attempts to explore an alternative hypothesis, earnings management, to account for the long-run performance after the acquisition. We argue that bidders in stock-financed mergers have incentives to boost up pre-merger earnings and this manipulation behavior causes the subsequent poor performance. We find that stock mergers do have aggressive levels of earnings management than cash mergers, and these high manipulated earnings are significantly and negatively related to the abnormal returns of stock mergers. However, there is no relationship between the degree of earnings management and long-run performance of cash mergers. Moreover, book-to-market ratios cannot explain the long-run abnormal returns of acquisitions when manipulated earnings are controlled. All these results suggest that the poor performance of stock mergers is mainly due to earnings manipulations, rather than the book-to-market effect or payment method.過去的文獻發現購併公司若選擇以合併方式進行，其購併後之股價長期表現不佳。後續 的研究提供了兩個可能的解釋原因︰付款方式的差異(以股票融資或現金交換)和偏低 的淨值市價比。本文則提出一個新的假說–盈餘操控行為–來解釋這樣的現象。本文的 論點在於以股票融資的購併公司可能虛報盈餘以降低購併成本，而導致日後偏低的股票 報酬。我們發現以股票融資的購併公司確實存在有盈餘操控的現象，而且這些虛報的盈 餘與長期股票報酬呈顯著的反向關係；以現金交換的購併公司則沒有發現這些現象。同 時我們也發現，當盈餘操控行為被控制後，淨值市價比並沒有辦法解釋股票的長期報 酬。所以，真正影響購併後股價長期表現的原因，不是購併公司所選擇的付款方式，也 不是淨值市價比，而是其購併時的盈餘操控行為。application/pdf31608 bytesapplication/pdfzh-TW國立臺灣大學財務金融學系暨研究所reporthttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/16274/1/912416H002027.pdf