董水量2006-07-262018-06-292006-07-262018-06-292005http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/18433We investigate the effect of CEO compensation structure (CS) on firm decisions, including internal decisions (financing, investing and operating decisions) and external decisions (financial analysts and stock-holders’ decisions.). Based on agency theory, we predict that the influence of CEO compensation on firm decisions varies according to its structure level. Consistent with our prediction, our results suggest that higher CS increases CEO’s incentive to manipulate reported earnings. We also find that higher CS is likely to encourage CEO’s to decrease debt to equity ratio by financing internally or issuing stock.application/pdf222966 bytesapplication/pdfzh-TW國立臺灣大學會計學系暨研究所CEO compensation structurefirm decisionsinternal decisionsexternal decisionsincentivesotherhttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/18433/1/932416H002027.pdf