2011-08-012024-05-16https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/669935摘要：多數股東與少數股東間權益之平衡不僅涉及多數股東行使權(利)力時有無界限及界限何在之問題，亦涉及少數股東之保護，看似分別之議題，實為一事之二面。亦即，多數股東行使股東權時，有無必要考慮到少數股東之利益，抑或只要對公司此一企業實體有利即可。其亦與公司治理及公司之內部管理息息相關。 外國於探討此類問題時，常指出多數決及法人格獨立等二大原則在多數股東與少數股東發生權益衝突時備受挑戰。因此，平衡之機制勢必衝擊此二原則並創造例外，準此，其間折衝十分重要。 基於表決權之優勢，多數股東不論在修改章程或進行股東會之決議均握有優勢。以章程修改為例，若修改條文對少數股東不利，此種多數決之結果，其效力如何便值得探究。特別是如何找出判斷效力之標準，對其權益之平衡具有重大意義。股東會決議常引用之迴避原理在我國法下是否過度簡化，有一併討論之必要。 此外，多數股東與少數股東間之緊張關係尚存在於不公平壓迫發生時應如何救濟；少數股東因為章程或法律之規定而被強制逐出時 (如資產讓與、現金逐出等)，我國法上所提供之傳統救濟是否具有實際意義，也是解決其間衝突時必須先予討論之議題。 董事通常由多數股東選出，若其有逾越權限或違反義務之行為，不論就該行為是否事後承認，或一併解除董事責任，仍屬多數股東與少數股東間權益平衡之事項。凡此種種，不一而足，本計畫將以實務與理論為底，將股東間之衝突予以類型化，再就各該類型找出個別解決之道及整體通用之法則。 <br> Abstract: Majority shareholders’ power and minority shareholders’ remedies are two sides of the same coin. They are the key issues of corporate governance and internal management. The majority rule and the principle of independent corporate legal personality will be challenged when minority shareholders claim for remedies. Caution must be exercised when creating exceptions to the two above-mentioned rules. Majority shareholders can easily alter the articles of association and pass resolutions at a general meeting. However, if the purpose in altering the company’s articles is to introduce compulsory transfer provisions to the articles as a means of removing minority shareholders (i.e., to expropriate minorities), it needs to be asked whether the alteration is valid. In addition, what is the basic test for the validity? Simply prohibiting majority shareholders from voting does not seem to be a wise solution. Besides, a tension between majority and minority shareholders also exists in several circumstances. Unfair prejudice is a popular issue in the UK. Should this system be introduced to Taiwan’s Company Law? When minority shareholders are cashed out or squeezed out, will the traditional remedy of appraisal rights provide sufficient remedy to them? All these issues should be clarified. The power of shareholders to pass resolutions ratifying directors’ breaches of duty and to pass other related kinds of resolution for the purpose of protecting directors is an important issue to this project. In general, directors are elected by the majority shareholders. Can majority shareholders exercise their voting power under this circumstance? This project will be centered on the different types of tensions between the majority and minority shareholders in order to determine the basic test for each type as well as the general principles applicable to all cases.多數股東少數股東多數股東之權力少數股東之救濟修改章程不公平壓迫侵奪少數股東之權利法定逐出機制資產讓與代位訴訟事後追認Majority shareholderminority shareholdermajority shareholder’s powerminority shareholder remediesalteration of articlesunfair prejudiceexpropriation of minoritiesstatutory squeeze-outsasset salesderivative claimsratification