2009-08-012024-05-16https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/666576摘要：第三年計畫：The Co-existence of Adverse Selection and Advantageous Selection 摘要 論文整合Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)關於逆選擇的模型和De Meza and Webb (2001)關於優勢選擇的模型，並分析逆選擇均衡和優勢選擇均衡存在的條件，論文結果能幫助瞭解為什麼部份實證文獻發現逆選擇均衡，然而許多實證文獻反而發現優勢選擇均衡。 <br> Abstract: 第三年計畫：The Co-existence of Adverse Selection and Advantageous Selection Abstract In this paper, I intend to set up a model where I can analyze the integrated effect of adverse selection and advantageous selection. In our model, as Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), I first assume that there exist two types of the insured: high risks and low risks. I then assume that both individuals can choose to make an effort to reduce the loss probability as De Meza and Webb (2001) did. I also assume that the insurer knows neither the risk preference of the insured nor the risk type of the insured, and then try to show the possible equilibrium the market could settle on. I expect to show that adverse selection and advantageous selection could co-exist in the insurance market. Moreover, the paper provides conditions for the existence of adverse selection and the existence of advantageous selection, and could be useful to explain why some papers observe adverse selection when others observe advantageous selection.保險逆選擇優勢選擇資訊不對稱道德風險insurance marketadvantageous selectionasymmetric informationmoral hazardadverse selection