2005-08-012024-05-15https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/661848摘要：高達美的意義理論：介於本質主義與反本質主義之間 本計畫是以語言哲學為線索，證明高達美詮釋學的意義理論是介於本質主義與反本質主義之間。我首先指出，在歐陸現象學傳統中，胡塞爾的意義理論是在本質主義(essentialism)的立場上。胡塞爾邏輯研究(Logische Unterschungen)的第一研究「表式與意義」(Ausdruck und Bedeutung, Expression and Meaning)認為，語言與意義是彼此區分的，這是說，語言只是符號(Zeichen, sign)，它關連於意識中的一個理念性意義(idealer Sinn, ideal meaning)，且表徵(repraesentieren, represent)一個意向對象。於是，語言似乎是物理性的符號，而意義是理念性的實有。由於意義是理念性的，則它超越時間和固定不變。人可以在不同的意識活動中，對同一的意義有不同的把握(Fassen, grasping)，由此說出不同的表式。因此，表式可以相異，但它關連於一個同一的意義(identical meaning)。由此可見，胡塞爾認為意義是一個同一不變的本質，<br> Abstract: Gadamer’s Theory of Meaning: Between Essentialism and Anti-essentialism This research tries to argue, by means of an analysis on language, that the theory of meaning in Gadamer’s philosophy is a theory between essentialism and anti-essentialism. I first show that Husserl’s theory of meaning, in the phenomenological movement of Europe, is a good example of essentialism. In the First Investigation of his Logische Untersuchungen Husserl points out that the language in an expression is a sign, which relates itself to an ideal meaning and at the same time represents an intentional object. However it is possible that expressions differ from one another, and the meaning they refer to may still remain identical. Since Husserl holds that meaning is identical in itself, his theory of meaning belongs to essentialism. The deconstructionism of Derrida opposes to the metaphysics of presence, i.e., it denies the existence of any stable reality. Derrida thinks, as Husserl does, that language is a sign, it nevertheless relates itself not to reality, but to other signs. And when the meaning of a word depends on its context with other signs, it is unstable and never remains identical in itself. Derrida deconstructs anything stable, turns it into fluid, undecided and into the process of self-differentiation. That is precisely the contention of the Derridian concepts of “undecidability” and “differance.” Since Derrida refutes the identity of meaning, his theory of meaning belongs to anti-essentialism. Gadamer rejects the sign theory of language. To him, language reflects things themselves. With language, man can have an understanding of things. That is what he says in his maxim: “Being, that can be understood, is language.” However Being, for Gadamer, is understood in the Heideggerian sense of aletheia, i.e., unconcealment. Being unconceals itself continuously by ways of difference, but it still remains the same. Gadamer calls it “differences exist in identity.” The meaning of a word shows itself continuously in differences, but it is still identical. From the aspect of identity, this theory of meaning belongs to essentialism; from that of difference, it is anti-essentialism. Therefore I conclude that Gadamer’s theory of meaning is between essentialism and anti-essentialism. Finally I show that it is not necessary and unreasonable to insist upon the simple identity of meaning, and essentialism is unacceptable in the theory of meaning; anti-essentialism provides no satisfactory explanation on the relationship between linguistic meaning and the world, and it should be abandoned. It is probably that Gadamer’s theory of meaning provides an adequate explanation in the identity of meaning and on the relationship between linguistic meaning and the world.胡塞爾德希達高達美意義本質主義反本質主義HusserlDerridaGadamermeaningessentialismanti-essentialism