辛炳隆Hsin, Ping-Lung臺灣大學:國家發展研究所陳仁勛Chen, Jen-HsunJen-HsunChen2010-05-052018-06-282010-05-052018-06-282009U0001-1508200902310200http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/180308本論文主要目的，除在探討台灣金融服務業董事酬勞之發放及董事持股比例的提高，是否有助於提升企業的經營績效外，也將驗證董事持股比例在酬勞對組織績效之影響的干擾效果是否存在。論文研究對象是43家台灣上市、上櫃金融服務業廠商。本研究以這些廠商2002至2006年當年度平均董事酬勞與前一年度財務績效進行相關分析，得出每一家廠商的相關係數作為本研究董事酬勞誘因機制之自變數。經由迴歸分析得到以下結論：.董事酬勞誘因機制對組織績效有正向影響。.董事持股比例對組織績效既無直接影響，也未顯著干擾誘因機制對組織績效的影響。外，本研究結果發現，外部董事比率對組織財務績效有顯著負向影響，係由於金融服務業管理階層易尋求外部董事為其政策背書，並未實際發揮獨立董事應有之功能。因此，未來應加強落實相關規定，以有效提高公司治理之成效。This thesis examines two research issues. First is whether increasing the compensation and ownership stake of directors of financial services firms in Taiwan helps a firm''s operating performance. The second is whether the impact of director compensation on operating performance is affected by the size of their ownership stake. he research presented in this thesis focuses on 43 financial services firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the GreTai Securities Market.he data used in this thesis compares current-year compensation versus previous-year operating performance for each year in the period 2002-2006 to obtain coefficients for each financial services firm. These are then used as independent variables for study of the compensation incentive mechanism.he empirical results show that . The compensation incentive mechanism is positively associated with operating performance. . Impact of the ownership stake on operating performance is not direct and does not significantly affect the impact of the compensation incentive mechanism on operating performance. n addition, this thesis finds that the proportion of independent directors has a significant negative association with operating performance. The directors of financial services firms tend to find external directors who will support their policies, therefore external directors fail to function as independent directors. Therefore, financial services firms should strengthen their internal rules to improve corporate governance.口試委員會審定書 i 謝 ii 文摘要 iii 文摘要 iv 一章 緒論 1一節 研究動機與目的 1二節 研究流程與章節安排 3二章 文獻探討 5一節 代理理論 5二節 董事酬勞對組織財務績效之影響 10三節 董事持股比例對組織財務績效之影響 15四節 董事持股比例在董事酬勞誘因機制對組織績效影響之干擾效果 21三章 研究方法 23一節 研究架構與假設 23二節 研究對象與資料來源 25三節 變數衡量與研究分析方法 25四章 實證結果與分析 28一節 敘述性統計分析 28二節 相關性分析 29三節 多元迴歸分析 31五章 結論與建議 37一節 結論 37二節 研究限制 37三節 研究建議 38考文獻 39application/pdf359918 bytesapplication/pdfen-US董事酬勞董事持股公司績效金融服務業酬勞誘因機制Compensationownership stakeoperating performancefinancial services firmscompensation incentive mechanismthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/180308/1/ntu-98-P96341013-1.pdf