2013-05-312024-05-17https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/680150摘要：本計畫旨在分析威權國家中的權力分享制度與籠絡制度對威權政體的政權存續，經濟表現，與經濟政策制定所產生的不同效果，並對這些差異提出解釋。本研究設定了三個核心議題。第一個議題要問的是，對於本計畫所設定的三個解釋目標而言，權力分享制度與籠絡制度哪一個更為重要？本計畫將提出權力分享制度較籠絡制度更為重要的假說。本計畫將論證，籠絡制度不足的負面影響可以被甄補機制的效果抵消，但權力分享制度的缺乏卻沒有其他機制可以替代。其次，在確定這兩個制度機制在效果上的差異後，本計畫將更進一步論證：若我們將制度設計視為連續的變量，它們的排列組合將可為威權體制的類型學帶來新的理論視角與經驗檢證的基礎。最後，除了客觀呈現不同政體在權力分享制度與籠絡制度兩個面向上的差異之外，本計畫更將論證某威權政體的甄補機制的排他性越低（高），該政體發展出權力分享制度的機會便越高（低）。除了試圖提出能解釋上述三個核心議題的理論框架外，本計畫還包括了對中國大陸的地區金融發展的案例研究與跨國的統計分析。首先，為了確保本研究的結論具有相當的一般性以及避免選擇偏差等推論上的問題，敝人將試圖建構符合本計畫研究目的的資料庫，以供大樣本的統計與計量分析使用。其次，大樣本研究無可避免存在著概念拉撐與簡化的疑慮，因此本計畫亦將加入對中國大陸金融發展的質性研究，確保本研究的理論可以適用於解釋世界上最大與最重要的威權政體。<br> Abstract: This project evaluates and offers an explanation to the different effects of authoritarian regimes’ power-sharing and cooptation institutions on their regime survival, economic performance, and economic policymaking. There are three core issues in this research project. First of all, as far as the three explicanda above are concerned, which institution is more important? This project contends that the power-sharing institution trumps the cooptation institution because, while the negative effect owing to the lack of the latter can be offset by an authoritarian recruitment mechanism, there is no such replacement mechanism when the former is absent. Second, after confirming the relative difference in their effects, this project further proposes a new framework for analyzing and categorizing authoritarian regimes by treating both institutions as continuous measures and combining them with different proportions to form an authoritarian institutional possibility frontier. Third, this project also argues that the likelihood for an authoritarian regime to develop power-sharing institutions is higher (lower) when its recruitment mechanism is less (more) exclusive. On the empirical front, in order to avoid selection bias and conceptual stretching, this project will not only put together a comprehensive dataset for cross-national statistical analyses, but also do field research in three Chinese cities, Beijing, Suzhou, and Tianjin , (selected both by the deviant and the extreme case methods) for qualitative case studies on China’s regional financial development.威權制度中國區域金融發展籠絡權力分享甄補機制政權存續Authoritarian InstitutionsChina’s Regional Financial DevelopmentCooptationPower-SharingRecruitment MechanismRegime Survival