林嬋娟臺灣大學:會計學研究所王泓達Wang, Hong-DaHong-DaWang2010-05-052018-06-292010-05-052018-06-292008U0001-2606200815331000http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/179916Pyramiding and cross shareholdings, among the most common mechanisms adopted by family businesses or business groups for control-enhancing, are deemed as expropriation tools over minority shareholders, and thus blamed for lower level of earnings quality. In this study I try to investigate if the utilization of pyramiding and (or) cross shareholdings (measured by the deviation of voting rights from cash flow rights) could also serve as a tool to mitigate earnings management due to slack in debt contracting.mpirical analyses show that good or bad family firms, from the perspectives of earnings quality, can be derived by separating family firms based on the degree of deviation of control from ownership, Moreover, despite that the deviation is positively related to abnormal accruals over a deviation threshold, the deviation is negatively associated with the extent of earnings management in family or group firms with low deviation, indicating the dominance of internal capital market below a deviation threshold.dditional analyses show that family and group firms are less conservative in the extent to which loss and gain are asymmetrically recognized. Besides, investors are sensitive to the board representation of controlling shareholders, thus demanding more conservatism when controlling shareholders occupy more board seats.口試委員會審定書i 辭 ii 要 ivbstract v. Introduction 1. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 11.1 Family firms and agency problems 11.1.1 Plus to firm value and performance 11.1.2 Minus to firm value and performance 12.1.3 Summary: Two contrasting forces of agency problems on family firms 13.2 family firms and earnings quality 14.2.1 Two agency problems on earnings quality 14.2.2 Entrenchment mechanisms by family firms on earnings quality 17.2.3 Divergence of control from ownership: only negative side on earnings quality? 20.3 Business groups and earnings quality 23.3.1 Business groups: paragons or parasites in earnings quality? 23.3.2 Divergence of control from ownership in business groups 26.3.3 Deviation in business groups: any positive side? 27.4 Summary of research hypotheses 28. Data and Methodology 29.1 Data 29.2 Measures of main variables 29.3 Empirical Models 32. Empirical Results 38.1 Descriptive statistics 38.2 Regression analyses 40.2.1 Family firms and earnings management 40.2.2 Group-affiliated firms and earnings management 43.2.3 Family firms, business groups and earnings conservatism 44.3 Summary of empirical findings 46.4 Sensitivity analyses 47. Conclusion 49ppendix: Variable Definitions 52eferences 54application/pdf650094 bytesapplication/pdfen-US家族企業集團企業金字塔結構交叉持股內部資本市場控制權與所有權偏離盈餘品質family firmsbusiness groupspyramidal groupscross shareholdingsinternal capital marketdeviation of control from ownershipearnings qualityhttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/179916/1/ntu-97-D91722001-1.pdf