指導教授：曾郁仁臺灣大學：財務金融學研究所黃依潔Huang, Yi-ChiehYi-ChiehHuang2014-11-272018-07-092014-11-272018-07-092014http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/262521This dissertation, which is divided into two parts, theoretically and empirically investigates effects of ambiguity, risk aversion, and bargaining power on outcomes of insurance bargaining. Specifically, the first part of dissertation “A Cooperative Insurance Bargaining Model with Ambiguity” theoretically analyzes how the optimal insurance contract will be affected by an increase in ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity by studying a cooperative insurance bargaining game with a risk-neutral insurer and a risk-and-ambiguity-averse client. I first show that full coverage is optimal in the presence of ambiguity and that the optimal premium becomes higher because of the introduction of ambiguity. Subsequently, both an increase in ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity are found to raise the optimal premium. The second part of dissertation “Who Obtains more Discount on Insurance Premiums?” uses the data on Taiwanese auto liability insurance for property damage to empirically examine whether an insured’s risk aversion and bargaining power are associated with his/her premium discount ratios. After controlling insured risks and underwriting variables, the results suggest that, on average, both more risk-averse insured (represented by the insured with multiple types of coverage) and the insured with weaker bargaining power (represented by the insured with claim records) obtain significantly lower premium discount ratios.Contents Acknowledgement ii Abstract in Chinese iii Abstract iv 1 A Cooperative Insurance Bargaining Model with Ambiguity 1 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 1.2 A Cooperative Insurance Bargaining Game . . . . . . . 4 1.3 An Increase in Ambiguity Aversion . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.4 An Increase in Ambiguity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 1.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Reference 16 2 Who Obtains more Discount on Insurance Premiums? 18 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 2.2 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 2.3 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 2.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 2.3.2 Measurement of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 2.3.3 Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 2.4 Empirical Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 2.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Reference 33 List of Tables Table 1 De finitions of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Table 1 De finitions of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 Table 2 Summary Statistics of Variables . . . . . . . . . 38 Table 3 Results of the OLS Regression on Premiums . . . . 39 Table 4 Results of the Tobit Regression on Expected Claim Amounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Table 5 Results of the Tobit Regression on Premium Discount Ratios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41459805 bytesapplication/pdf論文公開時間：2017/01/27論文使用權限：同意無償授權保險議價合作議價模糊模糊趨避風險趨避議價能力保費折扣thesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/262521/1/ntu-103-D97723007-1.pdf