陳聰富臺灣大學：法律學研究所蔡介文Tsai, Chieh-wenChieh-wenTsai2007-11-262018-07-052007-11-262018-07-052007http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/525972006年國內發生了「卡債風暴」，也就是信用卡、現金卡呆帳暴增，造成本國銀行2006年虧損74億元（2005年本國銀行獲利786億元），銀行委外催收卡債引發卡債族逃債、燒炭自殺等社會問題。本文要探討卡債風暴的成因、解決機制，並且從法社會學角度分析卡債問題的解決機制。 卡債風暴主要是因為雙卡業務的利差大，銀行為了搶占消費金融市場，忽略風險管理、浮濫發卡。到了2005年下半年，雙卡呆帳開始惡化，2005年雙卡轉銷呆帳金額710億元，2006年增至1629億元，銀行自食惡果。卡債問題的另一個原因是社會形態轉向消費社會，資本家之前控制生產工具剝削勞動者，現在則是透過「新消費工具」（例如百貨公司、電視網路購物）促使消費者過度消費，從中獲利。再加上廣告無孔不入、銀行浮濫授信，因此消費者容易走上過度消費、債臺高築的歧途。 政府為了解決卡債問題，建立卡債協商機制，提供優惠還款方案（例如分120期清償、0利率），卡債協商機制2006年底結束時，成功協商22萬兩千多件，金額合計3200億元，每件平均144萬元。此外，金管會處罰不當催收的銀行、催收業者，減少社會問題。 銀行也會起訴卡債族，不過2006年6、8、10月台北地院通常訴訟程序（金額超過50萬元）的卡債案件，其中原告為「國泰世華銀行」者占97％以上。2006年轉銷雙卡呆帳最多與次多的台新銀行、中國信託則鮮少起訴卡債族。 不僅銀行可以起訴債務人返還借款，卡債族也可以向法院聲請破產，免除部分債務。然而，我國破產要件十分嚴格，破產難以成立。以2005年為例，破產聲請合計514件（多為法人聲請破產），其中宣告破產50件，許可和解2件。消費者破產使用率顯然偏低，不足以解決卡債問題。值得注意的是2007年6月通過的「消費者債務清理條例」放寬債務清理要件，消費者將來會多一個處理債務的管道。 法社會學文獻表示，當事人實力不對稱時，實力強者（經常使用法院者）能利用法律，獲得有利判決；實力弱者（使用法院一次者）往往無法充分利用法律、實現權利。本文研究的卡債案件中，銀行事前決定契約內容（例如指定台北地院為一審管轄法院）、有律師代理，有效利用法律。 台新銀行、中國信託不常起訴債務人請求返還借款，它們反而是透過法院外救濟（電話催收、現場拜訪、和解）處理卡債問題。法院外救濟往往能彌補法院救濟的不足（法院判決不准許緩期清償、不調降利率，債務人無力償還；法院判決對無資力債務人，無計可施），向債務人施壓，促使他出面協商，並且透過外部徵信、債務人提供證明文件，確認債務人還款能力，給予合理的還款方案。 上述卡債問題的解決機制可分為法院救濟（銀行起訴債務人、卡債族聲請破產）與法院外救濟（卡債催收、卡債協商）兩類。法院救濟並非唯一的解決方式，甚至不是最有效的解決方式。本文建議政府應善加利用法院外救濟，減輕法院負擔，擴大紛爭解決。In 2006, Taiwan card-debt problems erupted. That is, credit and cash cards’ bad loans surged. The local banks lost NT$ 7.4 billion as a result, whereas in 2005 the banks made profits of NT$ 78.6 billion. Worse than that, bank’s debt collection measures caused debtors to run away or commit suicide. In this thesis, I intend to explore the causes of the card-debt problems and the mechanisms used to resolve the problems. In recent years, banks, which were lured by high interest rates on credit and cash cards, issued cards without adequate checks on customers’ credit-worthiness. In the second half of 2005, consumer bad loans began to increase sharply. In 2005, the provisioning expenses, which were made to cover potential bad debts, was NT$ 71 billion. The figure rose to NT$ 162.9 billion in 2006. Another cause of card debt problems was that Taiwanese society has turned into a consumer society. Consumers were controlled and exploited by the new means of consumption, such as department stores and cybermalls. They were encouraged to spend more. The prevalence of advertisements and the banks’ reckless lending also led to hyper-consumption and deeper indebtedness for consumers. The Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) and the Bankers Association established the card-debt negotiation mechanism in 2006 in attempt to resolve consumer bad loan problems. The mechanism allowed debtors to pay off debts with lower interest rates within longer period of time if they met the requirements. In the end of 2006, about 222,000 cases reached agreements on payback plans, with total card debts amounting to NT$ 320 billion, or NT$ 1.44 million per capita. The FSC also fined some banks because of their improper debt-collection measures. Creditor banks also sued card-debt defaulters. This thesis investigates the card-debt collection cases that were beyond NT$ 500,000 in Taiwan Taipei District Court in August, 2006. Most importantly, in these cases, 98% of the claimants were Cathay United Bank. In June and October, 2006, most of the claimants were Cathay United Bank as well. Other main banks, such as Chinatrust Commercial Bank and Taishin International Bank, seldom took card debtors to court. Some card debtors applied for bankruptcy and hoped the court would exempt them from some liabilities. However, it was unlikely consumer debtors qualified for bankruptcy. In 2005, there were only 514 bankruptcy applications and most of them were business bankruptcy, instead of consumer bankruptcy. 52 applications were permitted that year. In June, 2007, the legislature passed the Consumer Debt Clearance Regulation, so consumer debtors will qualify for bankruptcy more easily. When the disputant capabilities in adjudication are asymmetrical, the court ruling is usually more favorable to the competent party. In card-debt cases, banks wrote form contracts in advance and were represented by lawyers; debtors, in contrast, had little bargaining power in contract negotiations and most of them could not afford to hire lawyers. Therefore, in card-debt collection and bankruptcy cases, banks had the upper hand over consumer debtors. On the other hand, Chinatrust Commercial Bank and Taishin International Bank resorted to extra-legal measures to recover delinquent loans. They made debt-collection phone calls, visited debtors, and negotiated repayment plans. The extra-legal measures were often more effective than suing card-debt defaulters because the defaulters had few assets. The banks put pressure on debtors so that they would need to negotiate with the banks. In conclusion, the mechanisms of resolving 2006 card-debt problems included legal means and extra-legal means. Legal means such as debt-collection cases and consumer bankruptcy were neither the only nor the most effective way to solve the problem. Instead, the banks and debtors often interacted and settled out of court. This thesis suggests the government should place more emphasis on extra-legal means of resolution. The government can utilize this to resolve card-debt problems and ease the case burdens on courts.目錄 第一章 序論…………………………………………………………………………1 1.1 2006年卡債問題………………………………………………………………..1 1.2 卡債族的困境..............................................................................................................3 1.3 卡債催收…………………...……………………………………………………5 1.4 研究目的………………………………………………………………………...6 1.5 研究方法……………………………………………………………………...…7 第二章 從銀行經營的角度看卡債問題…………………………………………..8 2.1 1991年開放新銀行設立，銀行家數過多的問題……………………………..8 2.2 銀行存、放款利差 越來越小..................................................................................9 2.3 銀行衝刺消金業務...................................................................................................10 2.4 卡債風暴....................................................................................................................13 2.5 卡債風暴之後………………………………………………………………….16 2.6 小結…………………………………………………………………………….17 第三章 卡債族「過度消費」的社會學分析………………………………………..18 3.1 被剝削的消費者：新消費工具的出現………………………………………...19 3.2 消費的大教堂………………………………………………………………….20 3.3 新消費工具的再升級：以星巴克（Starbucks）為例…………………………21 3.4 信用卡與新消費工具的共謀………………………………………………….23 3.5 小結…………………………………………………………………………….24 第四章 金管會對於卡債問題的處理措施………………………………….…….26 4.1 卡債問題發生前，金管會對雙卡業務的管制……..………………….……..26 4.2 卡債問題惡化後，金管會的因應措施……………...………………….……..27 4.3 卡債協商機制..................................…………………………………….………29 4.4 協商機制的法律性質...............................................................................................31 4.5 卡債協商的功能……………………………………………………………….31 4.6 非一致性協商時，銀行決定還款期數、利率的標準………………………….32 4.7 金管會管制卡債催收…………………………………………...……………..34 4.8 小結…………………………………………………………………………….36 第五章 信用卡借款返還判決……………………………………………………38 5.1 原告請求債務人返還之金額………………………………………………….38 5.2 信用卡借款的「利率」………………………………………………………...39 5.3 被告不到場辯論……………………………………………………………….42 5.4 98％卡債案件原告為國泰世華銀行.....................................................................43 5.5 小結.............................................................................................................................46 第六章 消費者破產裁判…………………………………………………………..47 6.1 鄭三和破產案概要…………………………………………………………….47 6.1.1 債務人不能清償債務.......................................................................................48 6.1.2 法院實務上嚴格認定「不能清償」要件…………………………………49 6.1.3 債務人財產不足支付破產程序費用時，法院駁回破產聲請..…………50 6.2 鄭三和（破產法上）和解聲請案…………………………………………….51 6.3 消費者破產統計……………………………………………………………….53 6.4 消費者破產之改革：消費者債務清理條例…………………………………..56 6.4.1 放寬債務清理（破產）原因………………………………………………..57 6.4.2 不要求債務人財產足夠支付清算程序費用……………………………..58 6.4.3 法院逕行認可更生方案………………………………………………..…58 6.4.4 擴大不免責事由…………………………………………………………..60 6.5 小結…………………………………………………………………………….62 第七章 銀行與信用卡債務人的實力不對稱……………………………………..63 7.1 實力不對稱的雙方當事人........................…………………………………….63 7.2 律師、法院、法律……………………………………………………………66 7.3 銀行訂約時享有的談判優勢…………………………………………………67 7.4 銀行在律師、審判機構、法律等方面享有的優勢………………………….69 7.5 弱勢者的律師：法律扶助基金會…………………………………………….71 7.6 小結……………………………………………………………………………72 第八章 銀行的自力救濟…………………………………………………………74 8.1 訴訟外紛爭解決機制之一：以1963年美國威斯康辛州的製造商為例……74 8.1.1 雙方簽訂契約時，契約內容往往不夠充分……………………………...74 8.1.2 如果需要調整契約關係或發生紛爭時，往往不是按照契約規定，而是依 照商業習慣來處理………………………………………………………..75 8.1.3 發生違約時，製造商的自力救濟方式…………………………………..76 8.1.4 小結………………………………………………………………………..77 8.2 訴訟外紛爭解決機制之二：以2002年大陸「民間討債人」的研究為例…77 8.2.1 一則民間收債人的個案分析……………………………………………..78 8.2.2 民間收債的賽局分析……………………………………………………..79 8.2.3 不完全訊息賽局…………………………………………………………..81 8.2.4 收債人與債務人之間「訊息不對稱」…………………………………..82 8.2.5 小結………………………………………………………………………..83 8.3 卡債催收的特殊性…………………………………………………………….83 8.4 卡債催收方式………………………………………………………………….85 8.5 卡債協商的賽局分析………………………………………………………….87 8.5.1 債務人是「真卡奴」的情形……………………………………………..88 8.5.2 當債務人為「搭便車者」的情形………………………………………..89 8.5.3 卡債協商為完全訊息賽局………………………………………………..91 8.6 銀行自力救濟的極限………………………………………………………….92 8.7 小結…………………………………………………………………………….93 第九章 結論………………………………………………………………………..94 9.1 法院救濟的侷限………………………………………………………………94 9.2 法院外救濟的必要……………………………………………………………95 9.3 盜亦有道：法院外救濟的實體規範與程序規範……………………………96 9.4 法院外救濟的管制……………………………………………………………97 9.5 結語：收編法院外救濟………………………………………………………98 9.6 展望未來：消費者債務清理條例的影響……………………………………99 參考文獻……………………………………………………………………………1022432316 bytesapplication/pdfen-US卡債風暴呆帳委外催收卡債協商機制返還信用卡消費貸款消費者債務清理條例法律社會學法院外救濟card-debt problembad loanThe Financial Supervisory Commissionthe card-debt negotiation mechanismcard-debt collection casesthe Consumer Debt Clearance Regulationextra-legal means[SDGs]SDG3thesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/52597/1/ntu-96-R92a21004-1.pdf