陳其美臺灣大學：財務金融學研究所李仰淳Yang-tsun, LeeLeeYang-tsun2007-11-282018-07-092007-11-282018-07-092004http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/60709It has been well documented that in the event of a tender offer, the target management may take actions against the shareholders’ interest as an attempt to resist efficient takeovers or to facilitate inefficient takeovers. Legal constraints have thus been suggested to limit the target management’s discretion over investment decisions when a takeover attempt is made. This article compares the current legal constraints imposed by the UK and the US governments by examining their effects on the outcome of a takeover game, where after an acquirer expresses his intention to takeover the target, the target management can propose to make a new investment, while the target shareholders may (under the UK system) or may not (under the US system) have veto power against the manager’s investment proposal. The target manager is assumed to be better informed than the shareholders and the acquirer, and he seeks to maximize his benefits from stockholding and non-transferable private benefits. We prove that different legal constraints result in different equilibrium efficiency regarding both the takeover outcome and the new investment made by the target firm. We identify conditions which ensure that the UK system is superior to the US system, and vice versa. The paper sheds light on the optimal design of legal constraints, and suggests that different economic conditions imply different optimal legal constraints.1. Introduction 1 2. Tender Offer Regulations 3 2.1. Regulations 3 2.1.1. US: Business Judgment Rule vs. Fiduciary Duty 3 2.1.2. UK: the Code 4 2.2. Disputes on the Role of Target Management 5 2.3. Management Defense Tactics 7 3. Literature Review 9 4. The UK Regime 11 4.1 The Model in UK 11 4.2. BEs in Stage 4 and the Bid Price in Stage 3 15 4.2.1. BEs and the Bid Price when (H→I, L→NI) 15 4.2.2. BEs and the Bid Price when (H→NI, L→I) 18 4.2.3. BEs and the Bid Price when (H→I, L→I) 23 4.2.4. BEs and the Bid Price when (H→NI, L→NI) 32 4.3. S’s Acceptance in Stage 2 34 4.3.1. The Subgame of (H→NI, L→I) 34 4.3.2. The Subgame of (H→I, L→I) 34 4.4. Perfect Bayesian Equilibriums in Stage 1 37 4.4.1. PBEs when (H→I, L→NI) 37 4.4.2. PBEs when (H→NI, L→I) 39 4.4.3. PBEs when (H→I, L→I) 46 4.4.4. PBEs when (H→NI, L→NI) 50 5. The US Regime 53 5.1. The Model in US 53 5.2. BEs in Stage 3 and the Bid Price in Stage 2 54 5.2.1. BEs and the Bid Price when (H→I, L→NI) 55 5.3. Perfect Bayesian Equilibriums in Stage 1 57 5.3.1. PBEs when (H→I, L→NI) 57 5.3.2. PBEs when (H→NI, L→I) 58 5.3.3. PBEs when (H→I, L→I) 61 5.3.4. PBEs when (H→NI, L→NI) 62 6. Comparison Analysis 63 6.1. Comparison on (H→I, L→NI) 63 6.2. Separating vs. Pooling 65 6.3. Comparison on (H→I, L→I) 66 7. Conclusion 69 References 70444215 bytesapplication/pdfen-US併購市場效率投資效率管制訊號賽局Signaling GameTakeoverPrivate BenefitsRegulathesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/60709/1/ntu-93-R91723019-1.pdf