管理學院: 財務金融學研究所指導教授: 何耕宇張祐瑋Chang, Yu-WeiYu-WeiChang2017-03-032018-07-092017-03-032018-07-092015http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/274199近年來，公司資本結構研究多著重於其對公司價值之影響，而槓桿與員工薪資關係之研究仍方興未艾。本論文主要貢獻在於蒐集管理階層與平均員工薪資資料，探討台灣上市公司於2007年至2012年間，公司槓桿程度對於薪資的影響。研究發現公司槓桿越高，管理階層現金報酬及平均員工薪資越高；但與權益報酬卻無顯著相關。比較上市電子公司與非電子公司之差異，研究發現電子公司槓桿越高，公司管理階層之現金報酬及平均員工薪資越高；但與權益報酬卻無顯著相關。非電子公司槓桿越高，管理階層權益報酬越高；但與現金報酬及平均員工薪資卻無顯著相關。In recent years, research in capital structure mainly focuses on its effect on the value of firms. The empirical studies about capital structure and the employee compensation are, however, relatively few in number. In this dissertation, I examine the controlled variables of the managerial level and the firm, and conduct the empirical test to study the effect of leverage on compensation. I find that there is a significant and positive relation between leverage and either the managerial cash compensation or average employee compensation. There is an insignificant correlation between leverage and managerial equity compensation. I further separate the samples into electronics firms and non-electronic firms. I find that in electronics firms, there is a significant and positive relation between leverage and either managerial cash compensation or average employee compensation. There is an insignificant correlation between leverage and managerial equity compensation. In non-electronic firms, there is a significant and positive relation between leverage and managerial equity compensation. There is an insignificant link between leverage and managerial cash compensation or average employee compensation.1968587 bytesapplication/pdf論文公開時間: 2015/3/13論文使用權限: 同意有償授權(權利金給回饋本人)資本結構管理階層現金薪酬管理階層權益薪酬平均員工薪酬Capital StructureManagerial Cash CompensationManagerial Equity CompensationAverage Employee Compensationthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/274199/1/ntu-104-R01723085-1.pdf