Bui, Dien GiauDien GiauBuiYEH-NING CHENYAN-SHING CHENLin, Chih YungChih YungLin2023-12-052023-12-052023-1209275398https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/637509Firms with high-ability management teams disclose more disaggregated information in financial statements than other firms after accounting for endogeneity concerns. Investors deem the disaggregated information disclosed by high-ability managers to be more credible. More disaggregated accounting information reduces stock price crash risk and lowers the cost of equity to a greater extent when provided by high-ability managers. Superior managers’ performance pay is positively related to the level of financial statement disaggregation. These results show that high-ability managers and their firms benefit more from providing granular accounting information.enCredibility | Disaggregation | Financial statements | Managerial abilityManagerial ability and financial statement disaggregation decisionsjournal article10.1016/j.jempfin.2023.1014272-s2.0-85173269670https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85173269670