張時中蘇雅惠臺灣大學：陳貴男Chen, Guei-NanGuei-NanChen2007-11-262018-06-292007-11-262018-06-292007http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/51169品牌商和代工商不只有一般認為的合作關係，還有競爭和能力演化過程。以筆記型電腦產業為例，代工商負責研發設計、製造組裝和配送，品牌商則負責市場調查、行銷、銷售和售後服務。現在的文獻大多是以非量化模型來描述雙方的能力演化，尚缺乏量化研究來客觀地建立雙方共演化過程，若可提出量化模型用來作為能力移轉機制計量分析與設計的基礎，將運用到不同產業，提供其他產業預測未來能力演化。因此本研究進一步去探討有什麼因素、何種情況之下會導致能力移轉現象，再將不同時期的競爭合作演化關係，從定性轉化為定量的分析。 本研究分析對象為單一品牌商和單一代工商之間的關係，以蔡漢章在2005年筆記型電腦產業能力移轉時期研究、Fine在1998年關於能力改變導致產業內產品生產模式變化的雙螺旋循環模型和Jacobides在2004年關於能力分布和交易成本影響垂直範疇的能力循環機制和2005年關於能力差異、組織規模、學習曲線和交易成本之間互動的能力移轉數學摸型為基礎，建立雙方的共演化模型。本研究有兩部分：1.垂直範疇決策模型和2.能力移轉模型。 在建立垂直範疇決策模型，我們將Jacobides的模型擴展到包含廠商面臨最終顧客市場和雙方互動協議的中間產品市場，雙方決定主觀交易成本，以及生產、行銷能力、產能限制的限制之下，進行利潤最佳化賽局模型。重要特性包含： (1) 品牌商和代工商面臨不同最終顧客市場需求，各自有不同市場需求線和無法完全了解市場的誤差項，品牌商的資訊較為詳細確實，因此誤差項的變異比較小。 (2) 雙方互動採購協議機制的中間產品市場，雙方有各自願意銷售或購買中間產品價格和數量，經由不斷協議的互動過程，達到成交時均衡的價格和數量。 (3) 雙方各自主觀的交易成本，以不同且彼此間互不確知的參數建於雙方決策目標函數可以直接影響自製、外包或代工的決策。 (4) 能力分為製造和行銷能力，行銷具有邊際效用遞減效果，最終產品價格會隨著行銷投入越多而呈現趨緩的現象，行銷成本和價格可以指數分配來呈現。 再來將垂直範疇決策模型當中，由最大化利潤目標之下所決定的利潤作為能力移轉模型的投入，將利潤轉換為產能擴充、原有和新技術投資，整合產能與投資的下期預期收益數學模型，形成了能力循環的共演化模型。重要特性包含： (1) 投資的收益包含擴充中間產品或行銷的產能、縮減產能和投資新技術或新產品、中間產品、行銷能力所能獲得的收益。收益為預期利潤目標函數的增加項目，擴充、縮減和投資的收益效果決定在係數的大小，係數若小於0表示收益有虧損。 (2) 投資的成本包涵將投資用來進行中間產品或者行銷的產能擴充所付出的成 本，以及投資新技術或新產品、中間產品、行銷能力的成本。成本為預期利潤目 標函數的減少項目，只有擴充會有係數，若係數越大表示擴充導致更多潛在損失。 (3) 投資新技術或新產品的新技術因子，如果有新技術產能則新技術因子為1，會有新投資或新產品的收益，相反地無新技術產生則因子為0。 (4) 能力發展過程同時具備中間產品製造能力、行銷能力和新技術的能力。下期的製造和行銷能力和現有能力、投資能力效率和投資成本有關，各期能力會進行累積，但新技術只和投資能力效率和投資成本有關，因新技術無過去累積的能力。 本研究建立品牌商和代工商垂直範疇決策模型和能力移轉模型，貢獻在於： 1. 提供業界影響彼此競爭合作的因素，了解這些因素以發揮能力和競爭優勢。 2. 建立單一品牌商和單一代工商在經營範疇決策的利潤最佳化賽局模型。 3. 使用動態的概念探討利潤和下期投資的關係，投資的項目反映公司將利潤轉換成生產擴張、縮減和投資原有能力、新技術的ㄧ般化現象。 4. 公司在能力的演化不只侷限在原有能力，亦會透過創新而產生新技術，進入到下一時期的垂直範疇決策模型，除了交易成本，新技術也可反應產業內的互動。 5. 建立可運用到不同的產業、提供其他的產業進行預測未來能力演化的模型。 6. 提出一個數學模型作為能力移轉機制的計量分析與設計的基礎。Collaboration is usually considered the only relationship between contract manufacturers and brand companies. Actually, they have other relationships of competition and co-evolution. Consider the Notebook industry. Contract manufacturers are responsible for R&D, manufacture, assembly and transport the computers, while the branding companies are responsible for marketing, sales and after sales service. The current literature mostly describes the co-evolution between contract manufacturers and brand companies by qualitative models. There lack models for quantitative analysis and project of capability co-evolution. This study is to identify the factors that induce the capability evolution and situations that would induce the evolution, perform analysis and construct a qualitative capability co-evolution model between one contract manufacturer and one brand company. This thesis is focused on modeling the capability co-evolution relationship between one contract manufacturer and one brand company. Based on Tsai’s capability migration model in 2005, Fine’s double helix cycle model that describes production forms change by capability migration within the industry in 1998, Jacobides’ capability transformation in 2004 and mathematical model in 2005, we construct co-evolution model There are two parts in this study: 1. decision model of vertical scope and 2. capability co-evolution model. In decision model of vertical scope, both of them face the end user market and intermediate market of purchase negotiation mechanism. They have respective transaction cost to decide to outsource or product by itself. Under the limits of manufacture, marketing, capacity and outsourcing factors, we construct the game model of maximum profit which determinates the vertical scope of buying or selling intermediate and final products. The important captured features include: (1) Different market demand of final customers. They own different market demands that have the error term for not surely understanding the market. The variance of error term of branding company is lower because it has much information. (2) Intermediate market of purchase negotiation mechanism. They have respective selling or buying prices and quantities. By the interacting negotiation process continuously, they will reach the equilibrium prices and quantities for transaction. (3) Respective and objective transaction cost. Transaction cost could directly affect the decisions of outsource or producing by itself. The different and unknown parameters within both objective functions could directly affect these decisions. (4) Manufacture capability and marketing capability. Marketing capability has the effect of decreasing marginal utility. The more are marketing investments, the less rise of final production price would be. The relationship between marketing cost and final production price could be modeled as an exponential distribution. In the following, we take the profit that was decided by objective function in the decision model of vertical scope as the input of capability co-evolution model. We transform the profit into future investments of capacity expansion, original and new technologies. The model integrates the capacity and investments to influence the future capability distribution. Finally, we finish the co-evolution model between one contract manufacturer and one brand company. The important properties include: (1) Investment revenues are from expansion, shrink and investments of original manufacture, marketing and new technology. The revenues are the added items in the objective function. The effects of expansion, shrink and investment are decided by the coefficients. If the coefficient is less than 0, it means the revenue as a loss. (2) Investments include expansion and capability of original manufacture, marketing and new technology. The investments are the subtracted items in the objective function. Only the expansion costs have the coefficient. If the coefficient is higher, it means that expanding some capability would result in more potential loss. (3) There is the new technology factor by investing in new technology. If new technology happens, the factor will be 1 and the the revenue of new technology arise. Otherwise, If there is no capacity of new technology, the factor would be 0. (4) Capability development process shows the capabilities of manufacture, marketing and new technology in the next period. Capabilities of manufacture and marketing in the next period are related to original capabilities, efficiency of investing capabilities and investing amounts. The capabilities would be cumulated continuously. But capability of new technology in the next period is only related to efficiency of investing capabilities and investing amounts because of no cumulated capability. The contributions of the thesis are: 1. We provide the factors which could affect the co-opetition among the firms who might make use of their own capabilities to maintain their competitive advantages. 2. We construct the game model of maximum profit which determinates the vertical scopes between one contract manufacturer and one brand company. 3. We propose the dynamic concept to describe the relationship between the profit and investment. Investments show how to transform the profit into capacity expansion and shrink, original and new technology to react to the general phenomenon. 4. In addition of original capabilities, the firm could get new technology by innovation. Not only considering evaluating transaction cost, the innovation of new technology can also affect the interaction within the industry. 5. We expect this mathematical model also could be applied to other industries for predicting the future capability co-evolution. 6. We propose a mathematical model to illustrate the co-evolution model. It could be as a fundamental structure for quantitative analysis and design of capability migration.第 1 章 簡介 1 1.1 品牌商和代工商之間共演化模型的研究動機 1 1.2 文獻閱讀 2 1.3 研究範圍 3 1.4 論文架構 6 第 2 章 品牌商和代工商間的共演化問題 7 2.1 品牌商和代工商能力移轉之因素 7 2.1.1 市場不對稱性 8 2.1.2 交易成本 9 2.1.3 垂直範疇 11 2.1.4 能力發展過程 12 2.2 能力移轉機制 13 2.2.1 Fine的雙螺旋能力循環圖 14 2.2.2 Jacobides的能力循環圖與計量分析模型 16 2.2.3 品牌與代工商動態協力合作演進的現有研究狀況 22 2.3 研究問題 24 第 3 章 品牌商和代工商營運範疇決策的靜態模型 29 3.1 交易環境與假設 29 3.2 靜態模型的建構 31 3.2.1 單一品牌商和單一代工商之間垂直範疇的決策模型 31 3.2.2 代工商的內部利潤最佳化決策 32 3.2.3 品牌商的內部利潤最佳化決策 34 3.2.4 品牌商和代工商的外部交易市場與互動協議決策 36 3.3 品牌商和代工商之間垂直範疇決策的賽局數學模型 38 3.3.1 變數定義 38 3.3.2 代工商利潤最佳化決策的數學模型 39 3.3.3 品牌商利潤最佳化決策的數學模型 42 3.3.4 外部交易市場與互動協議決策的數學模型 44 3.3.5 單一品牌商和單一代工商之間的整體賽局數學模型 46 第 4 章 品牌商和代工商能力移轉的動態模型 48 4.1 整體的動態模型架構概論 49 4.2 利潤用於投資產能擴充與新技術的決策模型 50 4.3 品牌商和代工商決策的動態數學模型 54 4.3.1 變數定義 54 4.3.2 利潤用於投資產能擴充與新技術決策的數學模型 55 4.4 能力發展過程 58 第 5 章 結論與未來研究方向 61 5.1 結論 61 5.2 未來研究方向 64 參考文獻 652125404 bytesapplication/pdfen-US代工品牌交易成本經營範疇能力發展profit decisionoptimal problemgame theorymathematical dynamic modelingthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/51169/1/ntu-96-R94546023-1.pdf