李存修臺灣大學：財務金融學研究所陳汐怡Chen, Hsi-YiHsi-YiChen2007-11-282018-07-092007-11-282018-07-092004http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/60870可轉債和海外可轉債的發行在2002年和2003年快速成長，成為台灣公司熱門的籌資工資。但是，台灣公司發行海外可轉債與可轉債熱卻引起國內外投資人的質疑。因為若是海外可轉債與可轉債的發行條件優渥，加上承銷方式為投資銀行恰定特別人的方式銷售，買到的投資人會有套利機會，相對地稀釋掉其他投資人的權益而產生公司治理上的問題。 針對這個議題，本論文從海外可轉債與可轉債發行的三項契約條款進行實證研究探討。這三項條款方別為轉換價格中的基準價格和轉換溢價與是否有特別重設條款的設定。實證結果發現，公司治理確實會影響海外可轉債與可轉債轉換溢價與特別重設條款的設定。至於公司治理對條款中的基準價格在實證中並沒有顯著結果，尚有待後續文獻進行更深入的探究。Euro Convertible Bonds (ECB) and domestic Convertible bonds (CB) have become popular financing instruments for Taiwanese corporations in recent years. However, there may be corporate governance problem associated with ECB and CB issuance. In addition, shareholders’ wealth may be diluted if bond indenture is not fair enough. This article investigates the possible dilution effect by reviewing three clauses setting on ECB and CB. Empirical results show that ECBs and CBs of firms with better corporate governance characteristics end to enjoy high conversion premium and to resist special reset clause.1. Introduction 3 2. Sample selection and data 8 2.1 Sample selection 8 2.2 Details on the construction of the data 10 2.3 Dependent variables 16 3. Hypotheses developement 17 4. Empirical results 19 4.1 ECB sample 20 4.1.1 CAR 20 4.1.2 Regression analysis 22 4.1.3 Cross analysis 25 4.2 CB sample 26 4.2.1. CAR 26 4.2.2. Regression analysis 28 4.2.3. Cross analysis 31 5. Conclusion 33 6. References 351229334 bytesapplication/pdfen-US海外可轉債可轉換公司債特別重設公司治理Convertible Bond (CB)Corporate GovernancePositive effectEuro Convertible Bond (ECB)wealth expropriation effectthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/60870/1/ntu-93-R91723025-1.pdf