臺灣大學: 經濟學研究所王道一郭彥Kuo, YenYenKuo2013-03-272018-06-282013-03-272018-06-282012http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/253314為了解決投票矛盾問題，已經有很多論文發表。在我們的文章中，我們以策略式方法模仿Levine and Palfrey在2007年的投票賽局。我們的資料支持弱勢者效果以及競爭效果，但無論我們使用直接回應方法或是策略式方法，皆無法複製Levine and Palfrey在2007年的結果。我們也發現受試者並不使用嚴格的斷點策略。最後我們發現受試者的確會針對歷史的關鍵事件做出回應，這也是理性選擇模型最重要的意涵。Many papers have been published for solving paradox of voter turnout. In this paper, we adopt the strategy method to mimic Levine and Palfrey (2007)'' voting games. Ｗe find the underdog effect and competition effect supported by our data, but we cannot replicate the Levine and Palfrey (2007)’ result for neither the strategy method, nor direct response method. We also find evidences indicates that subjects don''t use fixed cut-off strategies. Finally, out data shows that voters are highly responsive to historical pivotal event, which the most important implication of rational choice model.140 bytestext/htmlen-US理性選擇模型關鍵選民賽局策略式方法投票矛盾實驗經濟學Rational Choice ModelPivotal Voter GameParadox of Voter TurnoutStrategy MethodExperimental Economicsthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/253314/1/index.html