國立臺灣大學哲學系暨研究所楊金穆Yang, Chin-MuChin-MuYang2006-07-252018-05-292006-07-252018-05-292004-07-31http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/14223威廉森(1995)論證，任何企圖將模態邏輯中的S4公設應用到一個素樸的「宣稱」概念上， 都將無法令人滿意地說明在(A4) Ap→ Aap中的「宣稱」概念。尤其是，就知識的原初性 與重要性而言，(A4)會造成一個無法接受的結果，就是有名的KK原則：Kp→ KKp，這 不是一個合理的知識概念所能允許的原則。威廉森(1996, 2000)進一步指出，宣稱的知 態規則就是如果主體S宣稱語句p，則S知道p，即(AK) Ap→Kp。 因此，如果我們接受(AK) 而拒絕(KK)，那我們就必須拒絕(A4)。而威廉森認為這是可以反駁反實在論之意義理論 的論證。 我首先論證，就威廉森對宣稱所做的知態說明，宣稱是一個強的規範性概念，(AKA) Ap→ Kap，也就是當一個主體宣稱p，主體不僅知道p，也知道他正在宣稱p。如同威廉 森(2000)指出，在知道與宣稱之間有一規範性關係，做宣稱時必須基於某些宣稱規則， 而這些規則是由知道概念來說明的。尤其是，宣稱是一個語言行為，是傳遞知識的載體： 我們藉由宣稱表達並傳遞我們的知識。(2000:238)這也說明了知道與宣稱間的強規範關 係。因為我們有某些型態的行為具有某些規範，即只要表現該行為，就知道自己在做什 麼。宣稱就是這樣型態的行為。因此，當‘Ap’成立時，不會有任何的理性主體會不知道 自己在宣稱p。這就證成了(AKA)。同時，(AKA)不會蘊含KK原則，雖然會蘊含弱的KK 原則，即(AKK) Ap→ (Kp→KKp)，但這並無損害。 甚者，因為宣稱的主要目的是傳遞知識──「我們需要宣稱來傳遞知識」──也因為 宣稱是語言行為，當主體宣稱P，其所傳遞的知識不僅是宣稱的內容，還包括宣稱這個 行為。因此我們可以說能夠成為被傳遞的知識一定是透過宣稱才行。因此，如果‘Ap’ 就是被傳遞的知識，‘AAp’就成立。我相信這樣對宣稱的說明可以說明(A4)中的‘A’。事 實上，我們可以證出，(AKA) 和 (AKK) 都是由( A4) 和 (AK)導出。因此，我們可以 給宣稱醫滿意的書名而不致導出錯誤的結果。Williaimson (1995) argues that any attempt to apply the S4 axiom of normal modal logic to a naïve notion of assertibility would fail to find a satisfactory account of the notion of assertibility to serve as the intended interpretation of ‘A’ in the desired characteristic formula (A4) Ap→ AAp. In particular, granted the primitiveness and primacy of knowledge, (A4) would render some undesirable consequences, notably the KK principle: Kp→ KKp, which could hardly hold in any reasonable notion of knowing. Williamson (1996, 2000) further proposes the knowledge rule for assertion, a constitutive rule in character, according to which an agent S asserts that p only if S knows that p, in symbols, (AK) Ap→Kp. It follows that if we accept (AK) and reject (KK), then we would be forced to reject (A4). And Williamson takes this as an argument against anti-realist’s programme for a theory of meaning. In this talk, I shall firstly argue, based on Williamson’s knowledge account of assertion, that assertion is a strong normative concept in that (AKA) Ap→ KAp holds, that is, when an agent S makes an assertion that p, S would not merely know that p, but also know that she/he is making an assertion that p. As Williamson (2000) rightly points out, there is a special normative relationship between knowing and asserting, in that the speech act of assertion must be based on certain rules of assertion, which are essentially constitutive and should be characterized in terms of the notion of knowing. In particular, assertion is a kind of speech act, which is to be taken as the vehicle for transmitting knowledge: ‘We express and communicate our knowledge by making assertions.’ (2000:238) This also suggests a strong normative relation between knowing and asserting as (AKA) shows. For we have some type of acts with a certain norm in that whenever one performs an act of this type, one knows clearly what one is doing. And strikingly, assertion, taken as overt speech act, belongs to such a type. Accordingly, when ‘Ap’ holds, it would never happen to any rational agent that she/he does not know that she/he is asserting that p. This would justify (AKA). Meanwhile, it can be argued that (AKA) would not imply the KK principle, though it will imply a weak version of the KK principle, i.e., (AKK) Ap→ (Kp→KKp), which is harmless. Moreover, since the primary purpose of asserting is to communicate knowledge－‘We need assertion to transmit knowledge’ (2000:267; 1996:520), and since assertion is essentially a kind of overt speech act, it can be further argued that when an agent S asserts that p, not only the content of what she/he asserts (i.e., ‘p’) but also the making of this assertion (i.e.,‘Ap’) become transmitted knowledge. Now it would perfectly make sense to claim that to be a transmitted knowledge only if it is asserted. Therefore, if ‘Ap’ is understood as a transmitted knowledge, then ‘AAp’ holds. I believe that this account of assertibility would provide a sensible interpretation for ‘A’ in (A4). In fact, it can be shown that both (AKA) and (AKK) can be derived from (A4) and (AK). We then have a satisfactory account of assertibility without rendering fallacious consequence.application/pdf35779 bytesapplication/pdfzh-TW國立臺灣大學哲學系暨研究所威廉森宣稱WILLIAMSONASSERTIONreporthttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/14223/1/922411H002030.pdf