陳聖賢臺灣大學：財務金融學研究所陳一如Chen, I-JuI-JuChen2007-11-282018-07-092007-11-282018-07-092007http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/60928本論文包含兩篇有關多角化公司購買資產的實證研究。第一篇是探討多角化公司購買資產對公司投資效率性與多角化公司價值的影響。本論文提出多角化成本(diversity cost)假說，主張當一多角化公司因購買資產使其多角化程度提高後，會加重內部資金市場資金分配的不效率，使公司整體投資效率降低，最後影響公司的超額價值。本論文利用1984年到2003年間，美國購買資產(asset purchase)的公司為研究樣本，發現當多角化公司因購買資產使多角化程度提高後，買完資產後公司的超額價值有明顯減損的現象，且對應的投資效率也顯著地降低。本論文發現投資效率的降低最主要是因內部資金市場分配的不效率所造成，當多角化公司買完資產後，其對低成長機會部門的補貼會更加嚴重。因此，本研究的實證結果支持多角化成本假說。 第二篇是探討多角化公司的公司治理程度，公司投資效率與多角化公司價值減損的關聯性。本論文利用在自1988年到2003年間美國購買資產的公司為研究樣本，發現公司治理程度較好的公司在購買資產後的投資效率性較高，特別是當一公司具有以下公司治理的特質時，在購買資產後的投資效率有顯著的提升：較大的董事會規模、較高的董事會獨立性、董事兼職他公司的情形較不嚴重、較高的機構法人持股、較高的外部董事持股、較高比例的經理人薪酬以股權型態支付、較佳的審計制度、和較好的投資人保護機制。本論文實證結果也發現多角化公司投資效率性的改變與公司內部資金市場資金分配的效率性有關。當一多角化公司的公司治理程度(不論是內部公司治理或外部公司治理機制)較高時，會從事較有效率的購買資產之投資決策並會提升公司整體投資效率性。本論文具體指出公司治理可確實降低多角化公司的代理問題，提升公司投資效率性，並提高多角化公司的超額價值。This doctoral dissertation contains two essays on the corporate asset purchases. The first essay examines a sample of diversified firms that announce asset purchases between 1984 and 2003. The empirical evidence shows that diversified firms are valued at a discount prior to the asset purchase and the value discount significantly increases following the transaction. We also find that the value loss mainly results from the diversified firms increasing their diversity and these firms experience significantly value discount following the asset purchase. In addition the changes in excess value around the asset purchase are noted to be positively related to changes in measures of investment efficiency. The results generated in this study support the diversity cost hypothesis. We also provide the evidence that rent-seeking behavior across divisions for diversified firms plays a crucial role in capital allocations. This allocation distortion contributes to the major source of the value discount for diversified firms. The second essay empirically investigates the relationship among the corporate governance, investment efficiency, and the excess value of diversified firms. Using a sample of diversified firms that announced asset purchases between 1988 and 2003, we find that diversified firms with better governance structure improve their investment efficiencies post asset purchases. The characteristics of well-governed diversified firms include larger board size, higher board independence, less busy board, higher institutional ownership, higher outside director ownership, higher CEO equity-based pay, better audit quality, and better shareholder’s protection. The empirical evidence indicates that the changes in investment efficiency are associated with the problem of cross-subsidization among divisions within diversified firms. Our study documents that governance has a substantial impact on the excess value of diversified firms through its impact on investment efficiency.Page Acknowledgments i Chinese Abstract ii English Abstract iii Table of Contents v List of Tables vii ESSAY 1 The Diversification Discount and Capital Allocations of Diversified Firms: Evidence from Corporate Asset Purchases 1. Introduction 1 2. Related literature and hypothesis statements 7 3. Methodology 12 3.1 Measuring excess value 12 3.2 Measuring investment allocations 13 3.2.1. Investment levels in individual segments 13 3.2.2. Firm-level measures of investment efficiency 14 3.3 Additional variables 15 4. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 17 4.1. Data sources and requirements 17 4.2. Data description 18 5. Empirical analysis 21 5.1 Changes in excess value 21 5.2 Changes in investment allocations at the firm level 25 5.3 Changes in investment allocations at the segment level 26 5.4 The relation between changes in excess value and changes in investment allocations 30 5.5 Robustness 31 6. Discussions 33 6.1 The diversification discount 33 6.2 Gains or losses from asset purchases 34 6.3 Changes of investment allocations 35 7. Conclusions 36 8. References 37 ESSAY 2 Corporate Governance and Investment Efficiency of Diversified firms: Evidence from Corporate Asset Purchases 1. Introduction 67 2. Literature and hypotheses statements 70 2.1 Governance structure and investment decision 70 2.2 Governance structure and firm valuation 72 2.3 Hypothesis and Predictions 73 3. Methodology 83 3.1 Data sources and requirements 83 3.2 Definitions to governance mechanisms 84 3.3 Measuring investment efficiency 84 3.4 Measuring excess value 86 3.5 Other control variables 87 3.6 Data description 89 4. Empirical analysis 92 4.1 Changes in investment allocations and corporate governance 92 4.2 Stock price reaction and corporate governance 98 4.2.1 The announcement period return and corporate governance 98 4.2.2 Changes in excess value and corporate governance 100 4.3 excess value, investment efficiency and corporate governance 101 4.3.1 Changes in investment allocations and the composite internal governance index 101 4.3.2 Changes in investment allocations and the composite external governance index 105 4.3.3 The relation among the change in excess value, the change in investment efficiency and the corporate governance 106 5. Conclusions 108 6. References 109en-US資產購買多角化公司價值多角化成本假說公司治理投資效率性內部資金市場asset purchasediversification discountinternal capital marketdiversity cost hypothesiscorporate governanceinvestment efficiencythesis